Evaluation of the performance of SDC instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts by unknown
Annex 1: OECD DAC principles of engagement 
 and SDC compliance 
 
Principles SDC compliance 
Take context as the starting 
point 
Good context analysis, but tendency toward 
“template” programmes. Health, decentralisation. 
Do no harm. Difficult to judge this, but generally SDC does well on 
this. 
Focus on state building as the 
central objective 
Tendency to avoid the state, or engage peripherally. 
Prioritise prevention This is done moderately well, mostly through actions 
of DPIV. 
Recognise the links between 
political, security and 
development objectives 
Not done well because of fragmented nature of aid 
bureaucracy. Small improvements being made. 
Promote non-discrimination as 
a basis for inclusive and stable 
societies. 
Not particularly part of portfolio. 
Align with local priorities in 
different ways in different 
contexts. 
SDC is good at alignment, and good at looking to civil 
society as well as government. 
Agree on practical coordination 
mechanisms between 
international actors. 
Sometimes SDC plays a very positive role in 
encouraging coordination. Sometimes it is quite 
absent. 
Act fast …. But stay engaged 
long enough to give success a 
chance. 
Not great at acting fast – but do stay engaged for long 
which is good. 
Avoid pockets of exclusion No good examples of specific programming on this in 
case studies, but certainly is the SDC “instinct”. 
 Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDFA 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC 
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1. Background 
SDC's Directorate has mandated SDC's Corporate Controlling Section1 to commission an 
Evaluation of the Complementarity of SDC's Instruments in Fragile and Conflict Affected 
Contexts2.  
 
Fragile contexts refer to countries affected by weak capacity, problematic state-society 
relations, deep social divides and/or the legacy of violent conflict. Over one sixth of the 
world‘s population – or approximately 1.2 billion people – live in countries designated by 
the international community as Fragile States3. SDC invests 28% of its budget of CHF 
1‘453 million in 33 of 43 such countries. In over half of these countries, SDC is engaged 
simultaneously in Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation or Transition 
Cooperation. Of SDC‘s 19 countries of concentration, 4 (or 21%) are Fragile States: 
Nepal, Niger, Tajikistan and Chad. Of SDC‘s 8 Special Programs, 3 (or 38%) are in fragile 
contexts: Afghanistan, Great Lakes /Burundi/Ruanda and Palestine. In many of these 
countries, SDC‘s engagement is relatively modest: in 13 of the 33 countries (or 40%) it is 
under CHF 3 million and in 8 of the countries (25%) even less than CHF 1 million. 
 
Engagement in fragile contexts is a non-linear process with tensions and trade-offs 
between the need to provide rapid support and life-saving activities while at the same time 
supporting development of sustainable state structures. This requires a shared space 
between humanitarian and development (and often security) actors as countries 
experience humanitarian emergencies, longer-term development programs and 
peacekeeping efforts simultaneously. Aid architecture promotes a compartmentalization of 
humanitarian and development aid which are governed by different principles, rules and 
regulations. Humanitarian Aid may sometimes bypass government structures whereas 
development aid strives to work with and through governments. This can create tension 
between the need to protect humanitarian principles such as impartiality and neutrality 
while working to build government capacity. Reality on the ground requires coherent 
integrated strategies, strong partnerships across aid modalities as well as clarity on roles 
and responsibilities. Over the years, this field of tension in the aid architecture - or aspects 
of it - have been referred to as the continuum-contiguum dimension, linking relief and 
rehabilitation, transitional cooperation or comprehensive cooperation. In this paper, we will 
use the terms comprehensive cooperation and ―whole of SDC approach‖ to refer to this 
field of tension. In addition, engagement in such contexts also requires ―whole of 
government‖ and ―whole of systems‖ approaches with coherence, coordination and 
                                                   
1
 SDC‘s Corporate Controlling Section is in the Staff of the Director General and independent of line 
management. The evaluations it commissions provide an independent perspective and constitute one of 
SDC‘s instruments for rendering accountability and promoting learning. 
2 Although  
fragile contexts tend to correspond to fragile states, there can be a discrepency between development of 
fragility and designation as a Fragile State, sometimes due to political reasons or to inability of the actors 
involved to acknowledge the reality. Hence the use of the more encompassing term fragile context rather than 
fragile state throughout this paper.  
3
 The OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) defines state fragility ―as a lack of 
capacity to perform basic state functions, where ―capacity‖ encompasses (a) organizational, institutional and 
financial capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a population and territory, and (b) the state‘s ability 
to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society. (…) state capacity is achieved through 
political processes of constructive state-society bargaining, which in turn require legitimacy; capacity and 
legitimacy can then become mutually reinforcing, and contribute to state resilience. The dynamic can also be 
negative if a lack of capacity undermines legitimacy and vice versa, contributing to state fragility.‖ (OECD 
2010: The State‘s Legitimacy in Fragile Situations. Unpacking Complexity, p. 15). The list of fragile states is a 
compilation of 3 lists: The World Bank‘s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 2008, the 
Brookings Index of State Weakness in the Developing World 2009, and the Carleton University Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy (CFIP) 2008 index. 
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complementarities (i.e., division of labor) between the different external actors (diplomacy, 
defense, development) and the partner country.  
 
A recent high level working group4 on Afghanistan and Pakistan set out a number of 
principles as a useful starting point for all sets of actors working in fragile states (and 
indeed in all complex systems) to challenge their way of thinking and acting. These 
principles are as follows:  
 
 To work to understand the systemic and contextual nature of the problems faced in 
fragile states5, how these problems have evolved and continue to evolve over time.  
 To involve those people who matter the most in the decisions that matter the most.  
 To avoid ‗silver bullet‘ strategies and instead attempt multiple parallel experiments with 
realistic timeframes and high acceptance / tolerance of failure  
 To establish real-time strategic analysis & learning as a key form of operational 
feedback. 
 To be open to the fundamental adaptation of efforts, along with changes in local 
contexts and conditions.  
 To reframe the overall fragile state engagement as a dynamic network of multiple 
systems and actors.6  
 
This analysis leads to the unambiguous conclusion that working in fragile contexts is as 
much about the ‗how‘ as it is about the ‗what‘. Understanding the context, being flexible, 
adapting to increasing insight and changing circumstances, creatively combining 
approaches and instruments, are all critical. 
 
The goal of the SDC‘s engagement in fragile contexts is to combat and overcome the 
vulnerability of the poor, the marginalised, those affected by violent conflict, and victims of 
natural disasters. The poor are in general more likely to be victims of violent conflict 
(refugees, for example) or of natural disasters. Failure to prevent natural catastrophes and 
violent conflict, coupled with neglect of their needs in post-crisis situations (peace building 
etc.) often results in the vulnerable being punished twice over. In the interests of justice, 
therefore, this group should receive more attention from those global actors that are 
equipped with the values and the opportunities needed for difficult contexts. The costs, in 
terms of security and collaboration efforts, and to a certain extent the risks, of such 
engagement are in general higher if compared to programmes in more stabile situations. 
And the probability of the results being achieved through our efforts in such difficult 
environments might tend to be lower. But they are justified if there are opportunities for the 
SDC to generate a value-added for a vulnerable population and to render visible the 
SDC‘s reputation in this area of fragility. 
 
SDC is challenged to achieve a ―whole of SDC approach‖. SDC has several mandates 
and deploys various modalities and instruments in its programs in fragile contexts: 
humanitarian aid, multilateral aid, development and transition cooperation across a broad 
spectrum of thematic sectors and instruments including policy dialog, programmatic aid, 
etc. In all of its programming, SDC pursues two transversal themes: gender and 
governance. All SDC programs must demonstrate a clear and critical understanding of 
these transversal themes and address them adequately.  
 
                                                   
4
 See http://www.santafe.edu/media/workingpapers/11-06-022.pdf 
5
 See for instance the DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations has 
this as its first principle, the DFID Summary Note on Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile 
Situations, Menkhaus, K in PRISM. 
6
 Ben Ramalingam ―Foreign Aid and Complex Systems Research: Exploring the Potential‖ Presentation Given 
at Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, February 24, 2011 
Annex 2 Approach Paper.doc 4
SDC is organised in four Departments with the following mandates: Regional Cooperation 
(RC) encompassing bilateral cooperation in the South, Global Cooperation (GC) covering 
multilateral aid and global programs in the areas of migration, water, climate, health and 
food security, Cooperation with Eastern Europe (OZA) and Humanitarian Aid (H). SDC‘s 
Humanitarian Aid Department engages in (i) emergency relief, (ii) reconstruction and 
rehabilitation, (iii) prevention and preparedness and (iv) protection and advocacy. SDC 
Humanitarian Aid is directly operational through its Swiss Humanitarian Aid Unit (SHA), a 
reserve unit of 700 specialists. It also works with and through multilateral organisations, 
state agencies, NGOs and the private sector.  
 
In the context of the 2008 reorganisation, the Europe /Middle Eastern Division in the 
Regional Cooperation Department was fused with the Europe / Middle Eastern Division in 
Humanitarian Aid Department into a new overarching E/MM Division crating a joint team 
with humanitarian and development backgrounds. A review conducted in 2010 found that 
it was too early to ascertain whether this new organisational form is more effective and 
many institutional solutions are possible to better integrate humanitarian and bilateral 
instruments. Many questions about how to best coordinate the RC/OZA/GC and H remain 
to be addressed.  
 
In addition to striving for a ―whole of SDC approach‖, SDC has also been strongly 
engaged in a ―whole of Swiss government‖ approach. SDC, the other Political Directorates 
in the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other implicated Swiss governmental agencies 
have jointly elaborated several country strategies in fragile contexts.  
 
Engagement in fragile environments presents SDC with human resource challenges. SDC 
is finding it difficult to recruit and retain staff willing to work in such environments and 
having the appropriate experience and skills mix is difficult. In addition, implementation of 
programs in fragile environments is more human resource intensive and more process 
oriented than normal development programs. SDC is beginning to address these 
challenges. 
 
SDC is presently developing its new Federal Council Dispatch 2013-2016 (Botschaft). 
This is a comprehensive binding document which lays out and legitimizes SDC‘s strategic 
orientation for the coming years. SDC‘s management is committed to increasing SDC‘s 
engagement in Fragile States and is deciding during the course of 2011 how it will re-
orient SDC in this direction. An ad hoc SDC working group led by the South Asia Division 
with representatives from the Regional Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid, Global 
Cooperation and Cooperation with Eastern Europe tabled a paper at the June 2010 SDC 
Senior Management Retreat entitled ―What Engagement for SDC in Fragile Contexts?‖.  
The ad hoc Working Group proposed that 
- SDC‘s commitment in Fragile States be increased from 28% of its budget to 40-
50% to be more in line with the international donor ―average‖, 
- The number of countries of concentration and the special programs in fragile 
contexts be successively increased to 12-15 countries /regions, so that in the 
medium term, about half of SDC‘s areas of concentration would be in such 
contexts, 
- The commitment per country / region be at least CHF 5 million for stronger focus 
and more visibility, 
- SDC‘s engagement be flexible over time horizon of 10-15 years, 
- SDC‘s mode of engagement should optimally and systematically combine all its 
mandates and instruments (humanitarian, bilateral and multilateral) in a 
comprehensive approach that takes regional contexts into consideration.  
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The paper identifies several areas of Swiss competitive advantage: Switzerland is 
perceived to be a modest, neutral player without a colonial legacy and hidden geopolitical 
agendas able to develop relationships of trust with a broad range of actors (governmental, 
nongovernmental and private sector). Its own history of multicultural integration and direct 
democracy lends credibility to its approaches. It is well-positioned to grasp the ―chance for 
early action‖ and to engage with the ―bad guys.‖ SDC‘s modest size, decentralized 
organizational structure, policy of long-term engagement and experience in difficult 
contexts as well as its proximity to the ―field‖ are strong advantages when working in 
complex and emergent contexts and enable it to react flexibly in volatile situations.  
 
While SDC‘s Director General agreed that in comparison to other OECD countries, SDC is 
under-engaged and would be well positioned to strengthen its profile, SDC‘s Directorate 
has not yet taken decisions regarding the proposals put forward by the working group, 
which were mentioned above.  
 
SDC is working internally and has contributed actively at the international level to 
establish principles for engagement in fragile contexts and aims to implement them in its 
own activities, for example:  
- Good Humanitarian Donorship (2003) 
- Paris Declaration (2005) 
- Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2007) 
- Accra Agenda for Action (2008) 
- 3 D‘s (diplomacy, defense, development) 
- 3 C‘s (coherence, coordination, complementarity) 
- Conflict Sensitive Program Management (CSPM) 
- ―Do no harm‖ Principles 
- DAC INCAF Statebuilding Guidance 
- Security Sector Reform (SSR), etc. 
 
In summary, SDC is looking for answers to many challenges it faces in fragile contexts: 
- Comprehensive programming: Addressing SDC‘s institutional/organisational, 
political and financial constraints in order to achieve integrated, comprehensive 
programs (development/transition cooperation and humanitarian aid);  
- Setting appropriate geographic and thematic priorities in its engagement in fragile 
contexts: dealing with the fields of tension between universal engagement / high 
visibility and priority setting / concentration and between the need for broad based 
humanitarian engagement versus domestic and peer pressure to concentrate 
development aid resources in a limited number of countries; 
- Achieving the required flexibility for engagement in emergent contexts with regard 
to human resources, financial resources, geographic engagement and responsible 
phasing out; 
- Programming effectively in fragile complex and emergent contexts; 
- Demonstrating and communicating about results in fragile contexts; 
- Appropriate partner selection. 
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2. Why an Evaluation and Why Now? – Rationale 
The evaluation is timely and appropriate for several reasons: 
 
The changing political landscape, the dynamics in partner countries and SDC‘s 
reorganisation are leading to a new paradigm with a focus on fragile contexts. SDC is in 
the process of redefining its mission and is committed to increasing its engagement in 
fragile contexts. The shift laid out in the new Dispatch will have strategic, organisational 
and human resource consequences. Evidence coming out of the evaluation should inform 
this process and be useful to SDC for implementing the new Dispatch.  
 
SDC recognizes that it must transcend the compartmentalisation between modalities / 
instruments and move towards a ―whole of SDC approach‖. SDC‘s reorganisation has 
been a step in this direction but serious challenges remain in ensuring that SDC‘s various 
mandates with their corresponding modalities and instruments complement each other 
and create synergies to achieve maximum effectiveness.  
 
SDC‘s thematic networks are still young and evolving, including the Network for Conflict 
Prevention and Human Rights. Here too, there are windows of opportunity to better serve 
all SDC constituencies, including those working in fragile contexts. 
 
The Evaluation Unit in Internal Revision (IR/E) in the General Secretariat of the Swiss 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs is interested in integrating the results of this evaluation in a 
synthesis it is compiling of the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs‘ engagement in fragile 
states.  
3. Purpose, Objectives and Focus 
3.1. Purpose 
The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a better understanding of the quality and 
effectiveness of SDC cooperation in fragile contexts to draw lessons and inform decision-
making and strategy development in SDC at various levels for the implementation of 
SDC‘s new Dispatch with increased engagement in fragile contexts:  
- Directors of SDC‘s Departments for improving the ―connectedness‖ of SDC 
programming across SDC‘s mandates; 
- Management for designing new strategies regarding future areas of engagement, 
staffing requirements, and improving operational processes in fragile contexts; 
- SDC operational staff for improving ongoing and designing future programs in 
fragile contexts. 
 
This evaluation also serves to render accountability to taxpayers in Switzerland, to 
partners and to the ultimate beneficiaries: SDC‘s Corporate Controlling Section, which is 
commissioning this evaluation, is outside of line management and reports to SDC‘s 
Director General. The evaluation team, which must be independent of SDC, will provide a 
critical perspective. Through such evaluation processes, SDC demonstrates that it is open 
to outside scrutiny, reflects on its performance and effectiveness and strives to learn in 
order to improve its programs.  
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3.2. Objectives 
The key objectives of the evaluation are the following:  
 
- Judge SDC‘s performance in its present engagement in selected fragile contexts 
from ―comprehensive aid‖ and ―whole of system‖ perspectives;  
- Provide a solid evidence base of where SDC stands and an analysis of where it 
needs to improve;  
- Through a process of reflective inquiry with stakeholders in SDC‘s departments 
and case study cooperation offices during the evaluation, develop a shared 
understanding among staff of each others mandates and how to engage in fragile 
contexts so that SDC activities across its departments / mandates become more 
coordinated, complementary and coherent; 
- Develop ―priorities for change‖ for SDC and with the Core Learning Group (CLP) 
develop clear, targeted and actionable recommendations for SDC‘s future 
engagement in fragile contexts. 
 
3.3. Focus and Scope 
This is a formative process evaluation which will assess SDC‘s performance in developing 
and implementing its programs in fragile contexts. It will focus on ―the whole of SDC‖, 
encompassing the interplay of SDC financed Humanitarian Aid, Regional Cooperation, 
Global Cooperation and Aid to Eastern Europe and the CIS and the choice of instruments 
SDC deploys in these modalities. The evaluation will also examine SDC‘s performance 
from a ―whole of system‖ perspective including SDC‘s coherence, coordination and 
complementarity with others in the partner country context. The evaluation will consider 
overarching organisational, management and human resource issues to the extent that 
they relate to SDC‘s performance in fragile contexts.  
 
In light of the limited resources, this evaluation is not expected to collect primary evidence 
of the outcomes and impacts of SDC programs. It will, however, render judgement 
regarding SDC‘s result orientation and ability to report on the effectiveness of its activities. 
It will take available reporting on outcomes / impacts into consideration. 
 
SDC‘s understanding of and efforts to contribute to ―whole of Swiss government‖ and 
―whole of system‖ approaches are to be covered. The performance of other parts of the 
Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of other Swiss government agencies and of the 
overall Swiss mechanisms for ―whole of Swiss government‖ approaches are not within the 
scope of this evaluation.  
 
This is not an evaluation of SDC‘s partners and their activities. The appropriateness of 
SDC‘s partner selection will, however, be examined to the extent relevant for assessing 
SDC‘s performance.  
 
The evaluation will focus on ―what is‖ and look back only to the extent necessary in the 
particular case studies to understand and assess the present engagement and to assess 
SDC‘s performance in adapting to changes in context (i.e., looking back at pivotal 
changes in country context which require adaption of SDC programming.  
 
The scope will encompass a representative sample of SDC country or regional programs 
in fragile contexts chosen to cover interesting constellations of mandates and different 
types of fragile circumstances. Chosen programs should encompass both humanitarian 
aid and development / transition cooperation. The sample should be large enough to draw 
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conclusions representative of SDC but manageable within the time and resource 
constraints of the evaluation. 
 
SDC‘s Corporate Controlling Section, in collaboration with the operational Departments, 
has identified the following programs as case studies (see also pg. 15):  
- Grands Lacs (Ruanda, Burundi, Congo) with a field mission, 
- Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) with a field mission to Tajikistan 
and telephone interviews with Kyrgyzstan, 
- Emerging Hindu Kush Program (Afghanistan, Pakistan)7 as a desk study with 
electronic communication with stakeholders and 
- Haiti as a desk study with electronic communication with stakeholders.  
 
The new organisational structure of the Europe/Middle East Division and its work in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) were reviewed in 2010. OPT will not be an in-
depth case study, but relevant staff may be interviewed to complement/clarify the 2010 
review. 
4. Key questions 
The question catalogue below is a preliminary "wish list" compiled by the SDC evaluation 
officer reflecting preliminary discussions with the evaluation stakeholders in SDC. The 
evaluation team will refine and prioritize the questions in consultation with SDC‘s 
evaluation officer and the Core Learning Group during the inception phase. 
 
Note: In the questions below, ―mandate‖ refers to the humanitarian aid mandate, 
development cooperation mandate, transition cooperation mandate and the overarching 
global programs mandate. 
 
A. Context Awareness, Flexibility and Adaptability:  
 
1. How well does SDC conduct context analysis and diagnostic work and then 
translate this knowledge into strategy and program development: How 
effective is SDC‘s Monitoring System for Development Changes (MERV)? Are the 
root causes of conflict and fragility as well as crisis and risks dynamics sufficiently 
and accurately considered? Are gender equality, governance, social inclusion and 
humanitarian issues sufficiently considered? How well is SDC able to grasp rapidly 
changing, emergent contexts? Does SDC conduct joint analysis across its 
mandates? Does SDC contribute to joint assessments? Are the analysis kept up to 
date? Are context analysis and diagnostic work translated into relevant strategies 
and objectives? In particular are the cross-cutting issues of gender and 
governance sufficiently understood and adequately addressed in diagnostic work 
then translated into strategies and programming? 
 
2. How flexibly is SDC able to react to changing situations: Do SDC programmes 
adapt appropriately and in a timely manner to changes in context? Is SDC able to 
take advantage of the narrow windows of opportunity during transition points 
between conflict and peacebuilding / emergency and development? 
 
                                                   
7
 The Regional Program Hindukush will focus on the narrow border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
as Switzerland‘s contribution to regional stabilization. SDC is phasing out its Pakistan Program. SDC will 
drawn on its Pakistan experience and resources and integrate its Afghanistan Program into the Regional 
Program. If the Hindukush Program is chose as a case study, it would need to be conducted in a 
―development evaluation‖ mode as the program is in the inception phase.   
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3. How conflict sensitive is SDC: Assess the quality of SDC‘s tool ―Conflict 
Sensitive Program Management‖ (CSPM). Assess the extent to which it, as well as 
the ―Do no harm‖ Principles, are operationalised in the case studies. How 
appropriate is SDC‘s choice of partners from a ―do no harm‖ perspective? How 
well does SDC deal with the tensions and risks faced by national program officers 
and partners as well as their mindsets (due to their own situations within the 
conflict dynamics as members of the society) and the repercussions this may have 
on the program?  
 
B. Cohesion of Organisational Mandates 
 
4. How well does SDC practice comprehensive cooperation and manage the 
tensions between its mandates as well as between development objectives:  
a) To what extent do SDC personnel across mandates understand each other‘s 
perspectives and modes of engagement? How aware is personnel of the 
tensions between the goals / perspectives / principles of the different 
mandates? How well are personnel across mandates able to develop a 
common understanding of goals/objectives and the means for achieving them? 
How supportive are staff of each other across institutional boundaries? Are 
there differences in staff perceptions depending on where they work (i.e. 
cooperation offices, headquarters)? Are the thematic networks able to 
establish bridges across the mandates? How well is SDC able to draw capacity 
and expertise from the different parts of SDC to enable holistic context 
analysis, strategies and programming? How can ―connector‖ tendencies be 
strengthened and ―divider‖ tendencies weakened? 
b) How well does SDC deal with the hierarchy, responsibility and decision-making 
challenges associated with integrating the different mandates into a 
comprehensive program? Which aspects of SDC‘s organisational structure and 
corporate culture promote a comprehensive cooperation mindset and which 
hinder it? How well does SDC manage the tension between headquarter policy 
evolution and overall coherency versus devolution of responsibility to the 
cooperation offices and the need for country driven, locally owned approaches 
and in-country coordination? 
 
c) To what extent are SDC programs integrated programs and tensions between 
mandates and objectives effectively managed: Within SDC programs, are the 
different mandates and instruments embedded in a coherent, comprehensive 
strategic framework? Does SDC combine the mandates and their instruments 
in its program in ways that are sequentially appropriate and mutually 
reinforcing? Does SDC create synergies between the mandates? How does 
SDC meet the challenge of upholding the distinction between humanitarian 
action and development / transition cooperation given that overall goals and 
principles differ and may compromise each other? Is SDC able to engage early 
and flexibly to address development needs in transition situations? How does 
SDC manage the tensions between development objectives, e.g., providing 
service delivery to meet immediate needs vs. building capacity of the state to 
do so, strengthening and empowering civil society vs. working with a 
government disconnected from its population to promote statebuilding?  
 
C. SDC‟s Role in the Broader System 
 
5. How well does SDC operationalize the 3 Cs (coherence, coordination, 
complementarity) and the 3 Ds (diplomacy, development and defense) from 
“whole of system” and “whole of Swiss government” perspectives? Looking 
at SDC programs as systems operating within larger systems, how well does SDC 
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implement the 3 Cs (coordination, coherency, complementarity) and work jointly to 
define and implement coordinated activities to reach shared objectives (examine 
with regard to ―Swiss whole of government‖ and with regard to ―whole of system‖ in 
the partner country)? To what extent do SDC personnel understand the 
perspectives and modes of engagement of the diplomatic and defence sectors? To 
what degree does the SDC program form part of and is connected to an overall 
country framework and coordinated with other policies, programmes within the 
partner country/region or thematic cluster? To what extent does SDC strive to fill 
gaps and avoid duplication in the partner country landscape? Assess the extent to 
which SDC has established an appropriate niche for itself which reflects its 
comparative advantage and identify where it could do more in this direction 
 
D. Delivery Mechanisms and Modalities 
 
6. How well does SDC analyze and manage the risks inherent in engagement in 
fragile context? How well does SDC manage corruption and fiduciary risk? How 
well does SDC manage the risk of program failure (―theory of change‖ failure due 
to flawed underlying assumptions as well as implementation failure due to flaws in 
execution)? How does SDC manage the tension between the need to be 
innovative and risk aversion? How well does SDC deal with security issues? How 
well does it assess the minimal security conditions for engagement? Does SDC 
have appropriate exit strategies? 
 
7. How well does SDC capture and report on the results of its engagement if 
fragile contexts?  
a) How well does SDC state an explicit theory of change, establish clear 
objectives, develop and monitor indicators, evaluate and report on the results 
of its engagement in fragile contexts? Are anticipated results based on 
realistic assumptions about the time it will take to deliver change? To what 
extent does SDC recognize and use jointly (donor and partner country) agreed 
results frameworks? To what extent does SDC use information coming out of 
such systems as well as its own program cycle management for its decision-
making for future programming? Does SDC promote nationally-owned 
indicators and local capacity to collect and use evidence for national policy-
making and program implementation? How can SDC best address the 
challenge of capturing results in emergent and rapidly changing contexts 
under difficult conditions as is the case in fragile contexts? 
b) In rendering accountability domestically, to what extent does SDC effectively 
communicate its case for engagement and the risk involved (e.g., risk of 
program failure, fiduciary/corruption risk, risk to personnel)? Is it adequately 
managing expectations and safeguarding the space it needs to be flexible 
(with Parliament, in its new Dispatch)? How well is SDC handling the field of 
tension between political demands for Swiss visibility, universal engagement, 
and clear attribution of results to Switzerland versus concentration of 
resources, longer term engagement towards effectiveness and sustainability 
and a contribution rather than attribution mindset? 
 
8. SDC is facing significant human resource problems in fragile contexts with 
difficulty in recruiting and retaining qualified, experienced staff. How can SDC best 
address this challenge? 
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5. Expected Results 
5.1. At Output Level 
By the Evaluation Team: 
 Aide Memoire of the Kick-off Meeting of the Inception Phase with the CLP,  
 Inception Report, Debriefing on the Inception Report with the CLP, Aide Memoire of 
the meeting, finalisation of the Inception Report based on SDC feedback, 
 Short briefing note to SDC‘s Directorate on the finalised evaluation design and key 
questions, 
 Aide Memoires of End of Mission Debriefings with the CLP, 
 Aide Memoire of the Debriefing with the CLP on the Draft Evaluation Report, 
 Facilitation of the Agreement at Completion Point Workshop with the CLP including 
elaboration of recommendations and lessons learned (in collaboration with the SDC 
Evaluation Officer), 
 A fit to print Final Evaluators' Report in English consisting of 
 Final Evaluation Report not exceeding 40 pages plus annexes and 
including an executive summary of maximum 4 pages, 
 A short and a long Evaluation Abstract according to DAC-Standards for the DAC 
DeRec database.  
 
By SDC: 
 Review of the findings and conclusions, and participation in the elaboration of 
recommendations based on the findings and conclusions.  
 An Agreement at Completion Point containing the Stand of the Core Learning 
Partnership  and recommendations for SDC 
 Lessons drawn by the Core Learning Partnership 
 Senior Management Response 
 Dissemination of the evaluation results 
 
5.2. At Outcome Level 
SDC‘s management translates the insights from the evaluation into its strategies, program 
development and human resources management related to SDC‘s engagement in fragile 
contexts. SDC improves the coherency, coordination and complementarity of its activities 




6.1. Organisational Set-up and Respective Roles  
 A Core Learning Partnership (CLP) to accompany the evaluation will be constituted 
at SDC HQs as well as in each of the Cooperation Offices in the case study countries 
with field missions. The CLP comments on the evaluation design and the key 
questions in the Kick-off to the Inception Phase. The CLP comments on the Inception 
Report and on the Draft Evaluation Report. During the Agreement at Completion Point 
Workshop, the CLP receives and validates the evaluation findings and conclusions 
and together with the Evaluation Team elaborates lessons learned and 
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recommendations for SDC which will be noted in an Agreement at Completion Point 
during the workshop.  
 SDC„s Directorate (Department-level Management and the Director General) will be 
interviewed by the Evaluation team. The Directors of Regional Cooperation and of 
Humanitarian Aid in consultation with the Director of Cooperation with Eastern Europe 
/ GUS will consider the Agreement at Completion Point of the CLP and draft a Senior 
Management Response which they will table in a meeting of the Directorate. The 
consensus of the Directorate is noted in the Senior Management Response which will 
be published with the evaluation report and form the basis for rendering accountability 
on the follow-up to the evaluation.  
 The Management Reference Group will be periodically interviewed by the evaluation 
team to bring in their perspectives on SDC. They will be periodically briefed by the 
evaluation team on emerging findings, should participate in the Priorities for Change 
Workshop, will help draft the Senior Management Response to the evaluation and 
ensure its implementation. 
 Consultants contracted by SDC's Corporate Controlling Section will elaborate an 
evaluation work plan and an Inception Report and carry out the evaluation according 
to DAC and SEVAL evaluation standards. They will conduct a Kick-off Meeting with 
the CLP at the beginning of the inception phase. They will conduct a debriefing for the 
CLP on the Inception Report and finalize it in consultation with the SDC Evaluation 
Officer to reflect the feedback as appropriate. They will conduct additional events with 
stakeholders throughout the evaluation process to ensure reflection and learning 
during the process (e.g., Visioning event during the inception phase). They will 
conduct debriefings for the stakeholders as appropriate following their evaluation 
missions. They will present a draft of their Evaluators‘ Final Report to the CLP, follow 
up on the CLPs feedback while safeguarding their independence and submit the 
Evaluator‘s Final Report in publishable quality as well as an Evaluation Abstract 
according to DAC specifications. In an Agreement at Completion Point Workshop (1 ½ 
day retreat) with the CLP, they will draw together the main conclusions of the 
evaluation and set out the evaluator‘s view of what needs to change (―priorities for 
change‖ and scenarios, if appropriate). From this starting point, they will facilitate a 
workshop process in which the CLP draws lessons learned and develops options and 
recommendations for consideration by SDC‘s senior management, which will be 
recorded by the evaluation team. The evaluation team leader may be asked to debrief 
SDC‘s Directorate at the end of the evaluation process. 
 Corporate Controlling Division (CC Division) commissions the evaluation, 
approves the final evaluation design and key questions in consultation with the CLP 
and the evaluation team, drafts and administers the contracts with the Evaluation 
Team, ensures that the evaluators receive appropriate logistical support and access to 
information, safeguards the independence of the team and facilitates together with the 
evaluation team the overall process with respect to the discussion of evaluation results 
and the elaboration of the Agreement at Completion Point. It is responsible for the 
publication and dissemination of the evaluation report. 
6.2. Members of the Core Learning Partnership (CLP) and Management 
Reference Group (MRG) 
 
The Corporate Controlling Section has tentatively identified the following persons for the 
Core Learning Partnership at SDC Headquarters: 
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Humanitarian Aid and SKH 
 Roland Schlachter and Marie Schärlig, Haiti Desk and Deputy Head, America-Asia 
Division 
 Armin Ullmann, Hindu Kush / Afghanistan / Pakistan / Central Asia Desk, America-
Asia Division 
 Roland Anhorn, Great Lakes Desk, Africa Division 




 Markus Heiniger, Focal Point Conflict and Human Rights Network, South Asia Division 
 Armin Rieser, Conflict Prevention and Transformation / Peacekeeping / Human Rights, 
South Asia Division  
 Lorenzo Suarez, Pakistan / Hindu Kush / Multilateral Affairs Desk, South Asia Division 
 Frank Wiederkehr, Afghanistan / Sri Lanka Desk, South Asia Division 
 Giorgio Bianchi, Great Lakes Desk, Southern and Eastern Africa Division 
 Vesna Roch, Haiti Desk, Latin America Division 
 Rahel Bösch, Multilateral Affairs Desk, West Africa Division (formerly COOF Amman) 
 Anne Claude Cavin, Burundi / Sudan Desk, Conflict Prevention, Eastern and Southern 
Africa Division 
 
Cooperation with Eastern Europe 
 Sophie Delessert, Tajikistan Desk 
 Santi Vega, Kirgistan Desk 
 Stephanie Guha, Bosnia-Herzegovina Desk (formerly Humanitarian Aid Sudan, 
Gender) 
 
Global Cooperation  
 Ségolène Adam, Conflict Prevention and Transformation / Post-conflict Management / 
Peacekeeping, Global Institutions Division 
 Milena Mihajlovic, Gender Desk, Office of Chief of Staff, Global Cooperation 
 
 
In the case study countries (Grands Lacs and Tajikistan), the evaluation team with 
constitute a COOF Core Learning Group and work with them during the missions. This 
CLP will draft a Management Response for the COOF indicating its follow-up to the 
evaluation. 
Management Reference Group (MRG) 
 
It will be important to consult with as well as to anchor the evaluation results with SDC 
management. The following management staff will form a ―Management Reference 
Group‖. They will follow the evaluation process, provide inputs as appropriate and take 
responsibility for implementing the Senior Management Response. They are welcome to 
attend all meetings or can delegate attendance to their staff in the Core Learning Group. 
 
Management Reference Group 
 
Humanitarian Aid and SKH 
 Hans-Peter Lenz, Deputy Head Humanitarian Aid and Head America-Asia Division 
 Bernhard Huwiler, Head Africa Division and/or Martin Jaggi, Deputy Head Africa 
Division 
 Burgi Roos, Head Europe and Mediterranean Division 
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Regional Cooperation 
 Maya Tissafi, Head Regional Cooperation 
 Willi Graf, Deputy Head Regional Cooperation (former Country Director Afghanistan) 
 
Cooperation with Eastern Europe 
 Véronique Hulmann, Head Commonwealth of Independent States Division 
 
Global Cooperation 





The evaluation process should be utilisation focused and engage the stakeholders 
throughout the process to ensure utility of the results for the stakeholders and encourage 
learning. The evaluation process will be iterative with periodic engagement of the Core 
Learning Partners and other relevant SDC staff and will include the following milestones: 
- Kick-off of the Inception Phase with the CLP conducted by the SDC Evaluation 
Officer and the Evaluation Team to:   
 introduce the Evaluation Team, 
 discuss the Draft Approach Paper 
 enable the Evaluation Team to better understand SDC's needs and 
priorities with regard to the evaluation. 
 hear their suggestions and concerns 
- Priorities for Change Workshop with the CLP and MRG: Brainstorming on 
Priorities for Change in SDC 
- End of Inception Mission Debriefing with the CLP conducted by the SDC 
Evaluation Officer and the Evaluation Team to 
 receive CLP feedback on the emerging Inception Report 
 reach agreement for finalisation of the evaluation scope, analytical 
framework, case studies, key questions and methodology 
- End of Mission Debriefings of the CLPs at Headquarters and in the case study 
countries by the Evaluation Team as appropriate to 
 inform the CLP of emerging findings 
- Debriefing of the CLP by the Evaluation Team on their Draft Evaluation Report 
 forum for the CLP to ask questions of clarification to the evaluation team  
 provide a sounding board for the evaluation team (Any factual errors? 
Difficulties of comprehension? Opportunity to ask additional questions, etc.) 
before the report is finalised. 
- Agreement at Completion Point Workshop with the CLP and MRG conducted by 
SDC Evaluation Officer and the Evaluation Team (1,5 day retreat outside Bern) 
 to conduct a process for the CLP to generate lessons learned and 
recommendations for SDC. 
 
An innovative feature of this evaluation is that the Core Learning Partnership and 
Management Reference Group will be actively involved in generating the lessons learned 
and the recommendations for SDC. Evaluation research shows that involvement of those 
responsible for implementation in generating recommendations leads to a higher rate of 
implementation. In the Agreement at Completion Point Workshop, the Evaluation Team 
will present their conclusions and ―priorities for change‖ and will be responsible for 
assisting the CLP / MRG to identify lessons learned and develop recommendations by 
facilitating an effective process of consideration of possible actions. The Evaluation Team, 
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assisted by the SDC Evaluation Officer, will be responsible for the process of generating 
and recording recommendations in an Agreement at Completion Point. This document will 
go to heads of Regional Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid as the basis for their 





The evaluation will pursue a mixed methods approach, drawing as extensively as possible 
on available data with supplementary primary research where necessary.  
 
The evaluation will develop an evidence base on which to form key decision-making 
debates on policies, organisational structure and approaches. 
  
In this sense the process is as important as the output; both have to be right to achieve 
the desired outcome. The aspiration is that through a process of mixing evidence and 
insight from a forensic look at the work of SDC in fragile contexts, key policy approaches 
will become clearer. For this to happen the involvement of key stakeholders from the start 
is a pre-requisite. This evaluation will therefore serve two purposes simultaneously:  
 
 Provide a context for increasing organisational awareness of its policy coherence and 
its structures, processes, and culture and how these affect its performance in fragile 
states. 
 An objective analysis of the policy coherence, structures, processes and culture, and 
how these affect SDC‘s performance in fragile states.  
 
The first three main lines of inquiry relate to the internal cohesiveness within the 
organization, and how well this is reflected in and aided by the organisational coherence 
and corporate culture. Perceived tensions between mandates and main definitions of 
purpose can cause centrifugal forces within the organisation, threatening to pull it apart or 
reducing its effectiveness.  How can these mandates be integrated into one 
comprehensive approach, and how can synergy be created between the mandates?  
 
Thus the overall approach taken should be strongly informed by the latest thinking on 
developmental evaluation, as outlined by leading evaluation thinker Michael Quinn Patton.  
 
This approach is tailored to complex environments, and sees the evaluator combining the 
rigor of evaluation (evidence-based and objective) with the role of enhancing a program‘s 
capacity for using evidence in reflective thinking on its work. It ensures that a program 
team learns during the evaluation process—not just at the end. This will not only increase 
the utility of the evaluation to SDC but will also support the ongoing commitment of the 
organization to develop strong design, monitoring and evaluation capacity. 
 
This approach will build on the notion of organisational behaviour as an emergent 
property, arising from the interaction between individuals and the systems and processes 
in which they are embedded. Values, norms, behaviours, routines and practices are 
mutually interacting elements that determine the actual performance of the organisation, 
and the congruence between the espoused theory; the way an organisation is supposed 
to function, and the theory-in-use; the way the organisation actually functions. A primary 
deliverable of the evaluation will be a shared sense of purpose, and a clear understanding 
of the complimentarity of the sub-components of the organisation which can lead to a 
stronger collaboration and internal cohesion.  
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Through this innovative process of reflection and clarification, potential synergies can be 
made visible to diverse members of the organisation, which will strengthen the sense of 
consensus, common purpose and complementarity of approaches.  
 
The developmental evaluation process should be an active, collaborative process with the 
actors themselves, not a static evaluation by the evaluation team. For this reason, the 
evaluation team will combine review of primary and secondary sources with a more 
dynamic approach, in which groups of actors are being taken through an exploratory 
search for cohesion and integration. This approach will take the management and staff of 
the organisation through an active learning process, which will have its immediate effects 
on larger organisational system awareness, and will make the impact of the evaluation 
higher in the long-run. This process-component of the evaluation will work on the basis of 
specific case studies, and use these as a locus of learning. It will also conduct workshops 
with relevant staff, such as the Priorities for Change Workshop during the Inception 
Phase.  
 
The evaluation will essentially take a case study approach, looking in detail at two regional 
strategies in fragile contexts. This will provide the empirical evidence needed for the policy 
debate on the degree to which integration can be achieved in practice, and how to go 
about this. It will also allow for analysis of policy and decision making process throughout 
the organisations. Because similar exercises will be carried out at different levels (and in 
HQ and in field offices) it allows for comparative analysis between the levels. This lends it 
a degree of objectivity that will allow the evaluation team to draw empirical conclusions on 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation. In addition, working from the basis of 
a specific case study allows for the simultaneous assessment of the espoused theory and 
the theory-in-use. In other words, it captures the devil in the detail.  
 
The case studies will combine desk-based data analysis, key informant interviews and site 
visits. A learning workshop will be carried out using evidence generated in the data-
gathering phase to discuss the processes of policy and strategy formulation and strategy 
execution.  
 
The case studies will include two with field missions and two desk based studies. The two 
field missions will be the Great Lakes (DR Congo, Rwanda, Burundi) and Central Asia 
(Tajikistan, with telephone interviews with Kyrgyzstan). The two desk based studies will be 
Haiti and Hindu Kush. 
 
Context Rationale 
Great Lakes  Ongoing conflict across the region, extreme poverty, regional 
instability, huge humanitarian caseload. 
Central Asia States in transition post-cold war and in some cases post-
conflict. Proximity to areas of major conflict, in particular 
Afghanistan. Authoritarian regimes, weak institutions, significant 
governance challenges, insurgencies. 
Haiti Government capacity severely constrained by the earthquake. 
Massive vulnerability and political fragility. 
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7.3. Main steps 
 
Activity Date Actors 
Call for Expression of Interest to 
identify potential team leaders 
March 2011 SDC Evaluation Officer 
Draft Approach Paper for Call for 
Offers 
April 2011 SDC Evaluation Officer with 
feedback from relevant staff 
Call for offers launched  April 15, 2011 SDC Evaluation Officer 
Selection of Evaluators  June  2011 SDC Evaluation Officer 
Contracts signed with Evaluators July  2011 SDC Evaluation Officer and 
CC Secretariat 
Recruitment of CLP August 2011 SDC Evaluation Officer,  
Logistical and administrative 
preparations 
- Contact List for Evaluation 
Team (CC Secretariat) 
- Reservations of venues for 
all meetings and retreats (CC 
Secretariat) 
August 2011 Evaluation Team., Corporate 
Controlling (CC) Secretariat,  
Logistics for Evaluation Missions  
- Interview Appointments 
- Hotel Reservations 
- Travel Reservations 
August 2011 Evaluation Team with very 
limited support by the CC 











Evaluation Team Leader, 
other Team Members as 
appropriate 





SDC Evaluation Officer, 
Evaluation Team Leader, 
other Team Members as 
appropriate, CLP 
Priorities for Change Workshop 





Evaluation Team Leader, 
other Team Members as 
appropriate 
Briefing Paper for Meeting with 
Senior Management ( final key 
questions) 
September 2011 Evaluation Team to SDC 
Evaluation Officer 
Meeting with SDC Senior 
Management (DirKo) to discuss final 
key questions 
September 2011 SDC Evaluation Officer, 
Inception MIssion Debriefing with 




Evaluation Team Leader, 
other Team Members as 
appropriate and SDC 
Evaluation Officer 
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Activity Date Actors 
Final Inception Report. Evaluation 
Process finalized.  
September 30, 
2011 
Evaluation Team in 
consultation with SDC 
Evaluation Officer 
Evaluation Implementation Sept.-Dec. 2011 Evaluation Team Leader, 
other Team Members as 
appropriate 
First Country Mission Tajikistan November. 2011 Evaluation Team Leader, 
other Team Members as 
appropriate,  
Second Country Mission,Great 
Lakes 
November 2011 Evaluation Team Leader, 
other Team Members as 
appropriate  
Validation of Emerging Findings 




Draft Final Evaluators' Report January 10, 2012 Evaluation Team delivers to 
SDC Evaluation Officer 
CLP Meeting to give feedback on 
Draft Evaluators' Report 
January 19, 2012 Evaluation Team Leader, 
other Team Members as 
appropriate, SDC Evaluation 
Officer, CLP 
Final Evaluators' Report January 26, 2012 Evaluation Team delivers to 
SDC Evaluation Officer 
Agreement at Completion with 
CLP / MRG 
February 2-3 
2012 
Evaluation Team Leader, 
other Team Members as 
appropriate, SDC Evaluation 
Officer, CLP 
Senior Management Debriefing (if 
necessary) 
end of February 
or beginning 
March 2012 
SDC Evaluation Officer, 
Evaluation Team Leader 
Senior Management Response March 2012 SDC Evaluation Officer SDC 
Senior Management, 
Publication and Dissemination April  2012 SDC Evaluation Officer and 
CC Secretariat 
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7.4. Evaluation Team 
 
SDC‘s Corporate Controlling Section has recruited an evaluation team that is independent 
of SDC and has not been implicated in the activities under evaluation. The evaluation 
team with Lewis Sida as team leader with Ben Ramalingam, Frauke de Weijer, William 
Frej, and Ross Mountain brings together high level practitioner experience in both 
humanitarian aid and development cooperation including the following experience / skills 
mix: 
- Demonstrated ability to evaluate in emergent realities from a complex systems 
perspective  
- Demonstrated ability to engage stakeholders in reflective inquiry using data 
coming out of the evaluation  
- Demonstrated ability in assessing organisational capacity and proposing corrective 
measures 
- Extensive knowledge of and demonstrated experience in implementing the 
principles for engagement in fragile contexts (e.g. 3 C‘s, 3 D‘s, SSR, do no harm, 
Conflict Sensitive Program Management, and other relevant principles in conflict 
/crisis contexts) and in implementing comprehensive cooperation 
- Demonstrated experience at a senior level in implementing humanitarian, 
development and transition programs in fragile contexts (field experience in the 
―comprehensive cooperation‖ dimension)  
- Competency in equality and gender issues (application of gender sensitive 
evaluation methodologies) 
- Excellent English (report to be delivered in ―native speaker‖ quality) 
- French and German competency (some case studies will require French),  
- Analytical and editing skills, ability to synthesize and write well 
- Communication skills 
 
Total person-days (for entire team) for this assignment: 170. The budgetary envelope for 
this evaluation is CHF 206‘000. including all travel and per diems to SDC headquarters 





Annex 3: Inception report 
 





1. Introduction  
 
SDC's Directorate mandated SDC's Corporate Controlling Section 1  to commission an 
Evaluation of the Complementarity of SDC's Instruments in Fragile and Conflict Affected 
Contexts.  This has been slightly altered as a result of the inception process to an 
Evaluation of the Performance of SDC Instruments in Fragile and Conflict-Affected 
Contexts. 
 
Following a competitive international tender, Lewis Sida was contracted as the Team 
Leader of the assignment, with Team Members Bill Frej, Ross Mountain, Frauke de Weijer 
and Ben Ramalingam.  
 
This document is the Final Inception Report for the evaluation and is a preliminary 
response specifically to the first two bullets in the „Expected Results at the Output Level‟ 
in the agreed Approach Paper.  
 
It builds on the Approach Paper by outlining the scope, focus, key questions, evaluation 
methods and broad timetable of the evaluation. Specifically, this Inception Report sets out 
the following information: 
 
 The objectives of the evaluation, and the focus and emphasis that will be taken in the 
evaluation  
 An evaluation framework covering areas of inquiry, specific questions for further 
exploration and possible sources of information.2 This includes: 
 
- A summary of how the evaluation meets OECD-DAC Guidelines on evaluation in 
fragile states. 
- A discussion of how the evaluation will cover the OECD-DAC Evaluation Criteria 
(relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impacts, sustainability) and the additional 
ALNAP criteria (connectedness, coherence, coverage).  
- A discussion of how the evaluation will address the issue of theories of change. 
  
 A summary of the evaluation tools that will be used in the process. 
 An outline of the participatory process of evaluation aimed at maximising the use of 
findings and relevance to the organisation. 
 An outline of the evaluation process and a broad timetable and work-plan. 
 
  
                                                     
1
 SDC‟s Corporate Controlling Section is in the Staff of the Director General and independent of line 
management. The evaluations it commissions provide an independent perspective and constitute one of 
SDC‟s instruments for rendering accountability and promoting learning. 
2
 This framework was developed using a detailed Evaluation matrix as a starting point, included in Annex 1. 
This matrix informed the Inception Phase of the Evaluation and included specific lines of inquiry, key 
questions and illustrative indicators.  
2 
This document is the final version of the Inception report. It is based on selected 
preliminary telephone interviews with SDC staff, a thorough document review of material 
relating to fragility and comprehensive approaches and a series of consultations and face-
to-face interviews held during the Inception Mission in September 2011. The inception 
report reflects the broad areas addressed in the Approach Paper that was developed by 
the Corporate Controlling Section of SDC. 
 
2. Objectives of the Evaluation  
 
This evaluation will be formative in nature, meaning its primary purpose will be to inform 
SDC policy makers and practitioners. It will be forward looking, drawing on SDC 
experience in fragile contexts to inform future work. At the same time, the evaluation will 
seek to satisfy accountability requirements, being independent and evidence based. 
 
Both the title and the objectives of the evaluation have changed slightly from those 
outlined in the original approach paper, as a result of the inception process. The 
objectives are as follows:  
 
1. Assess SDC‟s performance in its present engagement in selected fragile contexts, 
where possible from “comprehensive aid” and “whole of system” perspectives;  
2. Provide a solid evidence base of where SDC stands and an analysis of where it needs 
to improve;  
3. Through a process of reflective inquiry with stakeholders in SDC‟s departments and 
case study cooperation offices during the evaluation, develop a shared understanding 
among staff of each others mandates and how to engage in fragile contexts so that 
SDC activities across its departments / mandates become more coordinated, 
complementary and coherent; 
4. Develop “priorities for change” for SDC and with the Core Learning Group (CLP) 
develop clear, targeted and actionable recommendations for SDC‟s future 
engagement in fragile contexts. 
 
This is a formative process evaluation, with the focus on improving SDC‟s performance 
in developing and implementing programs in fragile contexts.  
 
The formative process aspects of the evaluation have a number of implications for the 
emphasis of the evaluation process and product.  
 
 All evaluations are a balance between learning and accountability, and between 
retrospective assessment and forward looking recommendations. The overwhelming 
feedback from SDC staff at all levels and across the organisation is that this 
evaluation should place relatively more importance on learning and on future 
improvements       
 As stated in the Approach Paper, this evaluation is not expected to collect primary 
evidence of the outcomes and impacts of SDC programmes. It will pose the question 
but will use existing data on SDC outcomes and impacts to inform analysis. Examining 
quality and scope of this evidence will enable assessment of SDC‟s results orientation 






3. Areas of enquiry   
 
The evaluation framework presents how the areas of enquiry, specific questions and 
possible sources of information fit together. This is informed by the draft OECD-DAC 
Guidelines for evaluating donor engagement in fragile states, which states that such 
evaluations “are best guided by a small set of broad questions aligned to the OECD DAC 
evaluation criteria rather than detailed questions answering particular concerns”. This was 
reinforced by feedback from SDC staff. The original and exhaustive evaluation matrix from 
which the framework below was derived is included in Annex 1. This was a necessarily 
exhaustive and detailed tool which was presented as „a set of parameters for the 
evaluation‟, and which enabled the refinement and focus of the evaluation.     
 
The value of such a framework, again in line with OECD-DAC Guidelines, is that it 
“allow[s] the evaluators to “tell the tale” of peace and development as they encounter it 
during the evaluation process… and will create a good margin to manoeuvre in defining 
the specific focus and approach of the evaluation”. 
 
Each of the four areas of enquiry were verified through the inception mission as 
appropriate for the needs of the different stakeholders across SDC. The specific questions 
were refined based on feedback through the inception process, with each focusing on an 

































How well do SDC‟s different mandates, mechanisms and modalities perform in 
fragile contexts? 
 
Reviews, evaluations, monitoring and 
reporting data, external data, internal and 
external interviews 
How systematically are performance, results and risks analysed and used to inform 
decision making and reporting?  
Results data, monitoring and reporting 
data reviews, evaluations, country case 
studies, internal interviews, risk 
management documents, 
communications materials, website 
What is SDCs capacity to deliver in fragile contexts, human, financial and through 
its partnerships? 
Document review, internal and external 
interviews, country case studies. 




How does SDC conduct context analysis and use this knowledge in strategy and 
programme development? How well does this happen (a) at a global level across 
the SDC portfolio (b) regionally (c) in specific countries? 
Document review, internal interviews, 
country case studies, assessments, 
workshops, interviews with Swiss 
counterparts 
How flexibly is SDC able to react to changing situations in specific country contexts 
- what blockages exist with regard to institutional flexibility and how are these 
navigated? How does SDC ensure the instruments it employs remain appropriate 
to given contexts? 
 
MERV analysis, Interviews, country case 
studies, analysis of regulations, workflow 
and funding mechanisms. 
How does SDC work to ensure its work is conflict and gender sensitive? How well 
does this currently work and how might it be improved?  
Assessments of conflict analysis tools 
Review of documents and strategies  
Internal interviews, country case studies. 
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How well does SDC practice comprehensive, coherent and coordinated (3Cs) 
cooperation across the different mandates – e.g. regional, OZA, humanitarian and 
global cooperation?  
Document analysis, internal interviews, 
external interviews, country case studies, 
workshops 
How well does SDC deal with the organisational and political challenges 
associated with integrating the different mandates into a comprehensive program? 
How can SDC improve the way it manages tensions and enhances synergies 
between different mandates? 
Internal interviews, reviews. 
Where SDC programmes are integrated into a single strategic framework, how well 
does this work? How are tensions between mandates and objectives managed? 
Reviews and evaluations, internal and 
external interviews, country case studies. 




Does SDC have a clear and defined „value added‟ niche for its work in fragile 
states? How is this developed and articulated to others?  
Reviews, internal and external 
interviews, country case studies, country 
workshops 
How well does SDC operationalize the 3 Cs (coherence, coordination, 
complementarity) and the 3 Ds (diplomacy, development and defense) from “whole 
of system” and “whole of Swiss government” perspectives? 
Reviews, internal and external 
interviews, country case studies. 
How well does SDC work with implementing partners, other donors, UN, and other 
aid providers? How well does SDC navigate issues of limited national government 
capacity for engagement and delivery? 
Reviews, evaluations, document 
analysis, internal and external interviews, 
country case studies. 
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A) Evaluation criteria 
 














The evaluation will seek to address all of these criteria, although as there will be no 
primary evidence gathering on programme outcomes, impact will only be considered 
through using available data: 
  
 Relevance – this will be covered in a comprehensive fashion through assessment of 
the way in which SDC understands and responds to fragile contexts. 
 Coherence and Coordination / Connectedness – how SDC‟s humanitarian and 
development efforts cohere and connect in conditions of fragility. Attention will also be 
paid to coherence with the wider Swiss government agendas and the „whole of 
system‟ approach. 
 Efficiency – this will be looked at in the context of delivery modalities – how are 
different approaches chosen, designed, and implemented. 
 Effectiveness – a key element of effectiveness relates to how modalities achieved 
objectives. This will be assessed using secondary data (internal and external), 
documentation and interviews of implementing partners and stakeholders. 
 
Issues of sustainability, impact and coverage are only addressed indirectly in the 
evaluation, as outlined in the Approach Paper. The key issue is one of available resources 
and scope. However, where such data is available through SDC‟s own reporting systems, 
this will be synthesised. The overall results orientation of SDC will be looked at as part of 
efficiency and effectiveness.  
 
B) Triangulation of evidence and analysis 
 
The evaluation will triangulate evidence gathered to inform robust analysis. The 
evaluation will be primarily evidence based, and conclusions will be on the basis of the 
combination of standard social science research methods outlined in section 4 below. The 
evaluation framework shows how these methods will be deployed to gather data against 
the areas of enquiry and specific evaluation questions, informing the subsequent analysis. 
 
Exploration of the orientation towards results within SDC's work will be an important 
source of data in this issue. By its very nature, understanding the results orientation 
means understanding the assumed, theorised connection between a set of inputs (SDC 
interventions) and hoped for results (see section C below). This should have informed 
programme design, from the identification of appropriate indicators, to the assessment of 
results, to the testing of assumptions and theories.  
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The evaluation will also be formative in nature, that is to say that it will primarily aim to 
inform strategy, policy and practice, in addition to presenting an objective analysis of SDC 
through a series of „snapshots‟ of country programmes. Thus the engagement of 
stakeholders in the process as set out in section 7 is of primary importance. 
 
The complex, inter-connected nature of the subject matter under investigation means this 
evaluation will be more expert driven that might otherwise be the case. Senior members of 
the evaluation team will bring their insights from donor and implementing agency practice; 
academic perspectives will also be incorporated in assessing the ways in which current 
SDC practice can be enhanced to better achieve objectives. Expert analysis will be 
central to the evaluation process and these three elements – robust evidence, stakeholder 
engagement and expert analysis will be critical to success. 
 
C) Theory of change 
 
Good practice says that interventions in fragile states - whether aimed at conflict 
reduction, state building or peace-building, need to articulate a clear theory of change that 
can be tested through evaluation. As the OECD-DAC guidelines put it:  
 
“Implementation logic or programme logic are terms used to describe why an activity or 
policy is doing what it is doing. A theory of change is a term closely related to 
implementation logic that is often used in this field to describe the links between inputs, 
the implementation strategy and the intended outputs and outcomes. It describes the 
assumed or hoped causal relationship between the activity or policy and its (intended) 
effects on larger peacemaking goals… Well‐founded theories of change are at the heart 
of effective work in all fields.” 
 
In practice, as is well known, theories of change are seldom made explicit in programme 
designs or strategies. The review of the regional strategies we have already undertaken 
suggest that this is also the case across SDC's work. 
 
 
The key is not to assume any theory of change has been employed up-front, or indeed 
that there is only one theory of change which has informed the way a programme was 
developed, or that a single theory of change has informed SDC's work. Because of the 
range of interventions that could be involved in a given setting, it is likely that there will be 
multiple theories of change which might be used in different programme and project 
settings. (See Annex 2 for more details) 
In fragile states contexts it is especially important for evaluators to identify and assess 
theories of change, because these theories are too often implicit, unexamined and 
untested.  
 
The OECD DAC guidelines on evaluating fragile contexts use the example of Kosovo, 
where the international community operated for several years under the assumption 
(theory of change) that peace could be achieved by improving relations between the two 
main conflicting parties. Based on this theory, it funded many programmes promoting 
dialogue, exchanges, youth interactions, women‟s groups, and so forth – all aimed at 
cross‐communal relationship building. However, a study found that work within each 
separate community to create more responsible leadership had a much greater effect on 
peace than the bi‐communal work. 
 
A key part of the evaluators role, then, will be to examine the nature of the programme 
logic employed in different settings, and attempt to get to the range of explicit and implicit 
theories of change, and how well each matches the context and stands up to external 
scrutiny.  
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Some interventions will already have a clearly stated vision of what they hope to achieve, 
as this will have been done as part of design and planning. Others will either be less 
explicit or deliberately avoid any such statements (often for political or diplomatic 
reasons). In many (perhaps most) cases, these theories are unconscious and unstated. 
 
1. Where the theory is not clearly stated it is possible for the case study method to 
elicit or discern the logic behind the activity as part of the evaluation process, 
especially in discussions with the implementation team. The evaluation will seek to 
“unpack” and map out the inputs, outputs and desired future outcomes – and the 
expected connection between these – in order to evaluate whether the strategy 
being used is logical and effective. 
 
4. Data Sources and Evaluation Tools   
 
A) Key informant interviews  
 
Key informant interviews will be a primary tool for investigation of the areas of inquiry set 
out in the Evaluation Matrix.  
 
Internal interviewees will include: 
 
 Directorate and policy makers. 
 Department directors.  
 Senior managers.  
 Policy staff and advisors. 
 Implementation staff. 
 Other government departments. 
 
External interviewees will include:  
 
 Partner organisations including UN, Red Cross and NGOs.  
 National government representatives in country case studies.  
 Other donor agencies.  
 Academics/ policy commentators. 
 
The interviews will be semi-structured and focused around the four key areas of enquiry 
and the key lines of enquiry. The detailed evaluation matrix will allow for specific 
questions to be developed depending on the position, background and expertise of 
interviewees. 
 
Broadly interviews will be based around: 
 
1. Context awareness, flexibility and adaptability 
2. Approaches, instruments, delivery mechanisms and modalities 
3. Cohesion of organisation mandates 





B) Facilitated Workshops  
 
There will be a series of facilitated workshops to gather data for the evaluation and also 
fulfil the learning objectives of the evaluation. Workshops include (but not be limited to):  
 
 A „priorities for change‟ with SDC programme staff and managers during the inception 
phase of the evaluation.  
 Country case study workshops. 
 An agreement at completion point workshop looking at how to implement the 
recommendations of the evaluation. 
 
C) Document and data analysis  
 
A number of documents have been identified as relevant for analysis of the key lines of 
enquiry. These include: 
  
 External reviews, evaluations and research on effective approaches in fragile 
contexts. 
 SDC strategy documents, parliamentary notes and guiding principles. 
 Results and outcomes data relating to SDC work in fragile contexts, and in particular 
in country case studies. 
 Project documents, end of phase reports, evaluations and reviews 
 Monitoring data 
 Guidance material 
 Credit proposals 
 
Each of these has potential to help further particular investigation into different lines of 
enquiry, and provide an auditable trail of intentions.  
 
For example, credit proposals should contain impact logic, be grounded in a theory of 
project cycle management; be based on strong context analysis. This should then be 
operationalised, monitored, with reviews and evaluations and end of phase reports which 
should then flow into annual country reports, country programme and medium-term 
strategies. These also then feed into multi-country and regional strategies, and 
occasionally „whole of government‟ strategies.  
 
D) Case studies  
 
Case studies are a widely-used qualitative approach in program evaluation. In the context 
of fragile states interventions, case studies are useful approaches in understanding the 
process, results and outcomes of program interventions. Less a tool and more an 
approach to gathering comprehensive, systematic, and in-depth information about a case 
of interest, case studies are especially useful where the situation is complex and there are 
many variables that cannot be controlled for. 
 
A key attribute of the case study approach is that it highlights why decision were taken, 
how decisions were made, how decisions were implemented and finally, with what results. 
Case studies can also illuminate the unintended negative effects of fragile states 
interventions. Because of its depth, the case study approach lies at the heart of the 




The objectives of the case studies, conducted during the main phase of the evaluation, 
are as follows:  
 
 To collect relevant material (reports, evaluations, data etc.) as well as SDC 
perspectives.  
 To facilitate internal reflection for SDC staff members. 
 To consult national actors (state and civil society), and other development partners 
and donors on the role of SDC. 
 
Context Rationale 
In-country case studies 
Great Lakes (Rwanda, 
Burundi, DR Congo). 
Ongoing conflict across the region, extreme poverty, 
regional instability, huge humanitarian caseload. DR 
Congo, Rwanda and Burundi all seen as fragile in different 
ways, although conflicts in all three inter-connected. 
Tajikistan/ Central Asia Transition from relief to development post-cold war and 
post-conflict. Proximity to areas of major conflict, in 
particular Afghanistan. Seen as fragile, but not failed.  
Desk reviews 
Haiti Complex mixture of natural disaster, extreme poverty and 
insecurity. UN peacekeeping mission. 
Hindu Kush Includes Afghanistan and Pakistan, archetypal „fragile 
states‟. New programme for SDC with potentially 
interesting new approaches. 
Nepal Existing programme that is held up as an important model 
for the organisation as a whole, with extensive 
documentation available. 
Middle East This is important both for review work already undertaken, 
the new merged organisation structure, the OPT and 
regional programme. 
Conflict and human 
rights thematic network 
The thematic network most closely associated with work in 
fragile states and a way of understanding the work of 
thematic networks more generally. 
Global cooperation Has an important role in SDC work in fragile states through 
multilateral relationships and work with other global donors. 
 
Data gathering methods: 
 
The case studies will combine desk-based data analysis, key informant interviews and 
workshops where possible.  
 
In-country: Great Lakes, Central Asia 
 
 Key informant interviews with SDC and Partners 
 Document and data gathering and analysis 
 Workshop in-country 
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Desk based: Haiti, Hindu Kush, Med-Middle East 
 
 Telephone interviews 
 Document and data gathering and analysis Key questions for the case study will be 
based around the four areas of enquiry and will be based on the evaluation matrix 
(above). Broadly they will include:  
 How accurate has the context analysis been? Is the theory of change underlying the 
programme strategy rooted in the context analysis and how has this changed with 
circumstances?  
 How effective has the SDC programming strategy been? How has its relevance and 
appropriateness been ensured in rapidly changing contexts? 
 How effective has the collaboration been (a) across SDC (b) across the Swiss 
government (c) across SDC partners (d) across the donor system? How important is 
collaboration to achieve programme objectives? 
 What is the role and relevance of SDC in the context of the case study, and where 
should it best focus its efforts?  
 
Thematically based: conflict and human rights network, global cooperation 
 
 These will not be formal case studies, but will rather help to inform the overall 
analysis. 
 Practically this will mean more interviews and a greater level of detailed document 
analysis in these areas. 
 The work of the conflict and human rights network will be examined by one of the 
evaluation team members actively participating over the period of the evaluation, as 
well as interviews with members and document review. 
 The work of the global cooperation division will be examined as it relates to SDC work 
in fragile states, in particular through its work with multilateral partners globally that 
might be missed if the focus was solely country or regionally based.  
 
5. Stakeholder engagement 
 
As outlined in the objectives, the evaluation will put in place a process of reflective inquiry 
which will in turn lead to shared understanding between staff working on different aspects 
of SDC's efforts. This will be achieved in three ways. First, the Evaluation management 
structure, involving: 
 
 A Core Learning Group (CLP): the CLP will consist of subject experts and will help 
guide, inform and champion the evaluation. The CLP will consist of practitioners most 
closely affected by the outcome of the evaluation, and as such will be the main 
repository for learning.  
 A Management Reference Group (MRG): the MRG will oversee the evaluation 
process and be responsible for ensuring policy relevance and uptake.  
 
These mechanisms are essential to ensure the learning aspects of evaluations are 
maximised and especially to ensure the evaluation findings are utilised. Regular 
engagement of these groups through the evaluation process is key to the evaluation 
success.   
  
Second, the evaluation process itself includes a number of workshop processes, to 
facilitate broad levels of group reflection at different levels. At head office, this has 
included a „Priorities for Change‟ workshop, which brought together stakeholders from 
across SDC to think collectively about the ways forward in relation to fragile states 
programming. At country office level, there will be workshops involving the SDC teams 
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and possibly external stakeholders, enabling shared reflection on issues of performance 
and value added. Wherever possible, the opportunity will be taken to conduct 
group interviews with more than one staff member.       
 
Finally there will be an Agreement at Completion Point workshop including the 
management reference group, the core learning group and other relevant stakeholders to 
frame the final recommendations and shape the management response to the evaluation. 
 
6. Evaluation Process with Key Milestones 
 
The evaluation process will comprise of the following broad phases, moving from the 
inception phase through to delivery in the first part of 2012. 
 
 
7. Evaluation team and roles. 
 
Lewis Sida is the team leader and will coordinate, guide and supervise the Evaluation 
Team, ensure quality and have the ultimate responsibility for the timely submission of all 
the evaluation outputs as listed in this document and the Approach Paper including the 
Final Evaluators' Report. He will be the main author of the report and ensure that the key 
questions have been adequately addressed.  
 
Lewis Sida will attend and lead all of the meetings in Bern. He will undertake the Grand 
Lacs case study and participate in the Central Asia case study. He will develop a process 
and organise the Agreement at Completion Point Workshop with the aim of ensuring a 
thorough discussion of the evaluation team‟s findings, conclusions and initial 
recommendations, and to arrive at an agreed list of final recommendations for 
considerations by SDC‟s Senior Management. 
 
Ben Ramalingam will provide strategic advice on the design of the evaluation, help with 
the drafting of the inception and final reports and advise on recommendations of the 
evaluation. He will undertake interviews and document review, and will attend all meetings 
in Bern. 
 
William Frej will undertake the Central Asia case study, travelling to Tajikistan. He will 
also input at the inception, drafting and final stages of the main report. Mr Frej will travel to 
Bern for the inception/ interview phase and the final presentation/ Agreement at 
Completion Point Workshop. 
 
Frauke de Weijer will input academic and strategic insight into key conceptual issues, as 
an author of the World Development Report 2011 on Fragile States. Ms de Weijer will 




Ross Mountain will be senior advisor on the Grand Lacs case study, providing guidance 
on the key issues to examine in the case study, and quality control on the product. Mr 
Mountain will input at the inception, drafting and final stages of the main report. Mr 
Mountain will travel to Bern for the inception/ interview phase and the final presentation/ 
Agreement at Completion Point Workshop. 
 




The key outputs from this evaluation will be; 
 Aide Memoires of debriefings including country case visits, validation workshop and 
draft evaluation report; 
 Facilitation of the Agreement at Completion Point Workshop with the CLP including 
elaboration of recommendations and lessons learned (in collaboration with the SDC 
Evaluation Officer); 
 A fit to print Final Evaluators' Report in English consisting of a Final Evaluation Report 
not exceeding 40 pages plus annexes and including an executive summary of 
maximum 4 pages, 
 A short and a long Evaluation Abstract according to DAC-Standards for the DAC 








Activity Date Actors / Team Members   
Call for Expression of Interest to 
identify potential team leaders 
March 2011 SDC Evaluation Officer 
Draft Approach Paper for Call for 
Offers 
April 2011 SDC Evaluation Officer with 
feedback from relevant staff 
Call for offers launched  April 15, 2011 SDC Evaluation Officer 
Selection of Evaluators  June  2011 SDC Evaluation Officer 
Contracts signed with Evaluators July  2011 SDC Evaluation Officer and 
CC Secretariat 
Recruitment of CLP August 2011 SDC Evaluation Officer,  
Logistical and administrative 
preparations 
- Contact List for Evaluation 
Team (CC Secretariat) 
- Reservations of venues for 
all meetings and retreats (CC 
Secretariat) 
August 2011 Evaluation Team, Corporate 
Controlling (CC) Secretariat,  
Logistics for Evaluation Missions  
- Interview Appointments 
- Hotel Reservations 
- Travel Reservations 
August 2011 Evaluation Team with very 









Evaluation Team Leader, other 
Team Members as appropriate 
Kick-off Meeting with the CLP 
 
Sept. 12, 2011 
10:00-12:30 
SDC Evaluation Officer, 
Evaluation Team Leader, Ben 
Ramalingam, William Frej, 
CLP 
Priorities for Change Workshop 
with selected staff 
Sept. 15, 2011 
10:00-12:30 
Evaluation team (all). 
Briefing Paper for Meeting with 
Senior Management (final key 
questions) 
Sept. 2011 Evaluation Team to SDC 
Evaluation Officer 
Meeting with SDC Senior 
Management (DirKo) to discuss final 
key questions 
Sept. 2011 SDC Evaluation Officer, 
Inception Mission Debriefing with 
the CLP  
Sept. 16, 2011 
9:30-11:00 
 
Evaluation Team (all) and SDC 
Evaluation Officer 
Final Inception Report. Evaluation 
Process finalized.  
Sept. 30, 2011 Evaluation Team in 
consultation with SDC 
Evaluation Officer 
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Activity Date Actors / Team Members   
Evaluation Implementation Sept.-Dec. 2011 Evaluation Team Leader, other 
Team Members as appropriate 
First Country Mission Tajikistan 31 Oct – 14 
Nov. 2011 
Evaluation Team Leader, 
William Frej,  
Second Country Mission, Great 
Lakes 
7 – 21 
November 2011 
Evaluation Team Leader. 
Validation of Emerging Findings 
Meeting with CLP 
December 15, 
2011 
Evaluation Team Leader, Ben 
Ramalingam. 
Draft Final Evaluators' Report January 10, 
2012 
Evaluation Team delivers to 
SDC Evaluation Officer 
CLP Meeting to give feedback on 
Draft Evaluators' Report 
January 19, 
2012 
Evaluation Team Leader, other 
Team Members as 
appropriate, SDC Evaluation 
Officer, CLP 
Final Evaluators' Report January 26, 
2012 
Evaluation Team delivers to 
SDC Evaluation Officer 




Evaluation Team Leader, other 
Team Members as 
appropriate, SDC Evaluation 
Officer, CLP 






SDC Evaluation Officer, 
Evaluation Team Leader 
Senior Management Response March 2012 SDC Evaluation Officer SDC 
Senior Management, 










Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-
DAC, ALNAP) and relevant 
questions from 
frameworks 


















root causes of 
conflict and fragility  




Document review, internal 
interviews, country case 
studies. 
This set of questions 
corresponds to the 




Is the intervention based on 
an accurate (and up‐to‐date) 
analysis of the country 
context? Is it working on the 
right issues in this context at 
this time?  
Does it therefore address 
relevant causes of fragility, 
key dynamics and driving 
factors, or key driving 
constituencies of the 
conflict?  
Has the effort responded 
flexibly to changing 
circumstances over time? 
Has the analysis been 
revisited or updated to guide 
Understanding of 
risks and dynamics 




Document review, itnernal 
interviews, workshops. 





 Document review, country 
case studies, internal and 
external interviews. 
Status of joint 
analysis across 
mandates 
Number and quality 
of joint assessments 
and reviews 
Assessments, reviews, 
internal interviews, country 
case studies. 
SDC contribution to 
Whole of 
Government 
Inclusion of SDC in 
formal 
documentation. 
Interviews with Swiss 
counterparts, document 
review, country case 
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Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-
DAC, ALNAP) and relevant 
questions from 
frameworks 
assessments   studies. action in changing 
circumstance?  
Are the international actors‟ 
country strategies based on 
sound political and social 
analysis (i.e. taking into 
account the situation in 
terms of national capacity, 




Are the stated goals and 
objectives relevant to issues 
central to the conflict and 
fragility?  
Do activities and strategies 
fit objectives?  
How well are “OECD DAC 
Principles for Good 
International Engagement in 





Data on spend, 
headcount, analysis 
in key documents, 
degree to which 




Document review, data 
review, internal interviews. 
Entry and exit 








internal and external 
interviews, country case 
studies. 
How flexibly is SDC 




adaptations in face 
of changing 
contexts  








Internal and external 






Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-




effectiveness of the 
same adaptations  
 Evaluations, monitoring 





 Identification of 
windows of 
opportunity in 
transition from relief 
to development 
environments 
Key decisions made 
to take advantage of 
such opportunities 





sensitive is SDC? 
Effectiveness and 
quality of tools and 
techniques for 
conflict analysis and 
sensitivity 
 Degree to which 
conflict analysis 
used in strategy 
setting. 
Assessments of conflict 
analysis tools 
Use of principles in 
conflict-related work 
Adherence to 
principles in policies 
and practices 
Review of documents and 
strategies  
Role of national staff 





Extent of national 
staff and partner 
involvement in 
decision making 
Internal interviews, country 
case studies. 
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Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-














How does SDC use 





e.g. MERV in fragile 
states  
 
Quantity and quality 
of data gathered, 
use of data in 
decision making and 
reporting systems 
MERV analysis, internal 
interviews, document 
analysis 
Quality of evidence 
used in decision-
making. 
Quantity and quality 
of data gathered, 
use of data in 
decision making and 
reporting systems 
MERV analysis, internal 
interviews, document 
analysis, country case 
studies. 






Are the instruments 




Whether SDC has 
the range and 
diversity of 
instruments 






Analysis of data from 
interviews, country case 
studies, documents. 
This set of questions 
corresponds to the 
evaluation criteria of 
Efficiency and Effectiveness 
Efficiency: 
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Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-














Does the intervention deliver 
its output and outcomes in 
an efficient manner (results 
against costs)?  
How does this particular 
programme or policy 
approach compare in costs 
to other options for 
achieving the same goals?  
How efficient is the general 
management of the 
intervention (steering, 
management, organisational 
and governance structures 
and procedures)?  
How well are resources 
used to achieve results?  
 
Effectiveness: 
How have SDC defined 
results or built the capacity 
to identify results in contexts 
with very weak institutions?  
 
What timeframes have been 
used to set goals and how 
have these been measured?   
Degree to which 
SDC instruments 








instruments are able 
to address problems 
identified in 
timeframe indicated. 
Analysis of data from 
interviews, country case 
studies, documents. 




theories of change, 
programme logic 
Analysis of theories 
of change (both 
explicit and implicit) 
Reviews, evaluations, 
internal and external 
interviews, country case 
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Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-




in fragile contexts? 
and overall results 
orientation. 
and performance as 
a result of these. 
studies. Has the intervention 
achieved its stated (or 
implicit) purpose, or can it 
reasonably be expected to 
do so on the basis of its 
outputs?  
Is (or will) the effort achieve 
progress within a reasonable 
time frame? Is it possible to 
accelerate the process? 
Should the effort be slowed 
down for any reason?  
 
Impact: 
What long-term changes 
(impacts) have been 
observed?  Have any 
unintended and/or negative 
changes been observed? 
How are these changes 
monitored, analysed and 
understood? Can these 
changes be reasonably 
associated with SDC 
intervention? 












monitoring and reporting 
data, external data, internal 
and external interviews 
How well does 
SDC analyze and 





failure due to flawed 
theories of change 
and implementation 
problems 
Degree to which 
organisation can 
tolerate failure and 
how this is dealt 
with. 
Reviews, evaluations, 






As above. Reviews, evaluations, 






Extent of security 
incidents and 





Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-



























website, internal interviews,  
How well does 
SDC capture and 
report on the 
results of its 
engagement if 
fragile contexts?  
 




Volume and quality 
of reporting against 
standards. 
Results data, reviews, 
evaluations, internal 
interviews, country case 
studies. 







Degree to which 
results information 
used in project 
documents and 
project formulation. 
Use of monitoring 




internal interviews, country 
case studies. 
 23 
Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-
DAC, ALNAP) and relevant 
questions from 
frameworks 




data and use of 






data gathering and 
policy development. 
Reviews, evaluations, 




complex nature of 






required in results; 







internal interviews, country 
case studies. 
Means of creating 
and ensuring space 
for flexibility when 
dealing with higher 
order parties e.g. 
Parliament 
As above. Reviews, evaluations, 
internal interviews. 
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Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-
DAC, ALNAP) and relevant 
questions from 
frameworks 
Means of managing 
tension between 
high visibility, high 
impact attributed 









Reviews, internal interviews. 
Level of 
competence of staff 
members in dealing 
with the analytical 
and operational 






internal and external 
interviews. 
SDC is facing 
significant human 
resource problems 
in fragile contexts 
with difficulty in 
recruiting and 
retaining qualified, 
Role of HR policies 
in recruiting and 
retaining quality 
staff  
HR policies and 
procedures, terms 
and conditions. 
Document review, internal 
and external interviews, 
country case studies. 
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Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-




How can SDC best 
address this 
challenge? 












its mandates as 







Number and extent 




Document analysis, internal 
interviews, country case 
studies. 
This set of questions 
corresponds to the 
evaluation criteria of 
Coherence and coordination 
and Connectedness 
Is there an agreed division 
of labour between 
mandates? 
Was co‐ordination factored 
into inputs (was it budgeted 
for) and outputs (is it 
explicitly listed as an output, 
and is it part of the expected 
evaluation reporting)? 
Has a coherent approach 
been institutionalised? Is 
harmonisation across actors 
growing? 
How much time and what 
Cross-mandate 
exchange and 





Number and extent 




ability to develop 
common goals 
across mandates 
Number and extent 







Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-
DAC, ALNAP) and relevant 
questions from 
frameworks 




goals. resources were spent on 
co‐ordination? Was it 
efficient (cost/benefit and 
appropriateness)? 
Did co‐ordinated work result 
in improved coherence in 
policy?  
What were the main 
constraints and challenges 
for coherence? How was 
good co‐ordination 
achieved, and is it replicable 
in other situations?  
 
Has practical coordination 
resulted in better analysis, 
greater agreement on 
strategic objectives and 







Degree of diversity 
of perceptions. 
Internal interviews 
Role of thematic 
networks in bridging 
mandates 
Degree to which 
networks influence 















are not „holistic‟. 
Evaluations, reviews, 





As above. Internal and external 
interviews, document erview 
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Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-
DAC, ALNAP) and relevant 
questions from 
frameworks 
Role of SDC 
structure and culture 
in promoting or 
inhibiting 
comprehensive 
cooperation mindset  
 




Internal interviews, reviews, 
evaluations 
How well does 















relating to policy 
coherence and local 
relevance, country-
driven nature of 
programmes 
Extent to which 
there are expressed 
tensions, and 
evidence of where 
such tensions (if 
there are) influence 
programme design 
and implementation. 









procedures that can 




Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-
DAC, ALNAP) and relevant 
questions from 
frameworks 



















Synergies that have 





Reviews and evaluations, 
country case studies. 
Management of 
tensions between 







transition from relief 
to development and 
how these have 
been managed. 
Reviews, evaluations, 
internal and external 
interviews, country case 
studies. 
Role of longer-term 
development 
planning in 
transition from relief 
to development 






internal and external 
interviews, country case 
studies. 
Ability to manage 
tensions inherent in 
fragile states vis a 
vis service delivery 
to replace state and 
state building  
Evidence of where 
there are tensions 
between service 
delivery and state 
building, and how 
these are managed. 
Document review, 
evaluations, internal and 
external interviews, country 
case studies. 
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Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-
DAC, ALNAP) and relevant 
questions from 
frameworks 








evaluations, internal and 
external interviews 
Area of enquiry 4: 




How well does 
SDC operationalize 








“whole of system” 
and “whole of 
Swiss government” 
perspectives? 
Ability to work with 
rest of Swiss 
Government  
Analysis of relevant 
collaborations and 
extent to which 
these take place in 
fragile contexts. 
Reviews, internal and 
external interviews, country 
case studies. 
This set of questions 
corresponds to the 
evaluation criteria of 
Coherence and 
coordination, 
Connectedness  and 
Effectiveness 
 
Do the development 
partners have a whole-of-
government  country 
strategy (i.e. one joint 
strategy for the partner 
country, including political, 
development, security and 

















How well does SDC 
mobilize upper 
hierarchical levels in 
the Foreign Ministry 
and other Swiss 
ministries to achieve 
its objectives?  
Degree to which 
SDC priorities are 
taken up by the 
Foreign Ministry, 




Annex of Inception Repent 1: Evaluation matrix used to set specific parameters for the evaluation 
Area of 
enquiry 
Line of enquiry Key issues  Potential 
indicators 
Means of Verification Evaluation Criteria (OECD-
DAC, ALNAP) and relevant 
questions from 
frameworks 
How well does 










 Document analysis, internal 
and external interviews, 








are used and how. 
Reviews, evaluations, 
internal and external 
interviews, document 
analysis, country case 
studies. 
How well does 
SDC work with 
other donors, UN, 
NGOs and other 
aid providers? 
Ability to work jointly 





How SDC works 
with other donors 
and operational 
agencies, and 




internal and external 
interviews, country case 
studies. 
Extent to which 
SDC duplicates / 
adds value to 
cooperation 
landscape  





Evaluations, internal and 
external interviews, country 
case studies. 
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Annex of Inception Repent 2: Theories of change in fragile states 
 
Theories commonly employed in fragile states include the following3: 
 Individual change theory: reduction in fragility comes through the transformative change of 
a critical mass of people, including their knowledge, attitude, behaviours and skills.  
 Healthy relationships and connections theory: fragility is best addressed by breaking 
down isolation, polarisation, division, prejudice and stereotypes between/among groups.  
 Withdrawal of the resources of war theory: conflict requires vast amounts of material and 
human capital to be sustained. If the supply of people and goods is disrupted, the war-
making system will collapse and peace will break out.  
 Reduction of violence theory: peace results from a reduction in the level of violence 
perpetrated by combatants.  
 Root causes/justice theory: we can reduce fragility by addressing the underlying issues of 
injustice, oppression, exploitation, threats to identity and security, and people‟s sense of 
injury and victimisation.  
 Institutional development theory: fragility is addressed by establishing social institutions 
that guarantee democracy, equity, justice and fair allocation of resources.  
 Political elites theory: fragility is diminished when it is in the interest of political (and other) 
leaders to take the necessary steps. Peace-building efforts must change the political 
calculus of leaders and elites.  
 Grassroots mobilisation theory: if enough people are mobilised to oppose fragility and 
conflict, political leaders will have to pay attention.  
 Economic theory: individuals and leaders make decisions based on systems of incentives 
that are essentially economic in nature. By changing the economic logic associated with 
war, we can bring about peace.  
Public attitudes theory: fragility, conflict and violence are partly motivated by prejudice, 
misperceptions and intolerance of difference. We can promote peace by using the media 




                                                     
3
 DFID (2005). Why we need to work more effectively in fragile states. 
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Annex 5: Interviewed People 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
Segolene Adam, Programme Officer Global Cooperation. 
Roland Anhorn, Senior Advisor Africa Division Humanitarian Aid.  
Tabassum Mohammad Arif, Hindu Kush. 
Manuel Bessler, Vice-Director and Delegate for Humanitarian Aid.  
Benoit Meyer-Bisch, Programme Coordinator for Governance and Desk Horn of Africa.  
Veronique Bourquin, Programme Officer Occupied Palestinian Territory.  
Elisabeth von Capeller, Head South Asia Division. 
Anne Claude-Cavin, Advisor for Conflict Prevention. 
Jean Francois Cuenod, Nepal. 
Martin Dahinden, Director General. 
Sophie Delessert, Programme Officer for Central Asia. 
Martin Fassler, Head of Staff of the Directorate.  
Chrystel Ferret, Deputy Head, East Africa Division. 
Thomas Gass, Ambassador and Head of Cooperation, Nepal. 
Christof Graf, Deputy Director, Global Cooperation. 
Stephanie Guha, Programme Officer. 
Markus Heiniger, Policy Advisor Conflict and Human Rights. 
Andreas Huber, Hindu Kush. 
Veronique Hulmann, Head CIS Division.  
Bernhard Huwiler, Head of Africa Division, Department Humanitarian Aid. 
Kurt Kunz, Assistant Director General and Head of Department Cooperation with Eastern 
Europe.  
Antoine Laham, Policy Advisor Conflict and Human Rights. 
Peter Lehmann, Hindu Kush. 
Yves Mauron, Deputy Director of Staff, Humanitarian Aid. 
Milena Mihajlovic, Advisor for Gender and Quality Assurance. 
Anna Marie Minder, 
Michel Mordasini, Assistant Director General and Head Global Cooperation.  
Giancarlo de Picciotto, Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
Sarah Pfister, Hindu Kush. 
Burgi Roos, Head Division Europe and Mediterranean Region,  
Jean Daniel Ruch, Occupied Palestinian Territories 
Gerhard Siegried, Head South Asia Division. 
Laila Sheikh, Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
Martin Sommer, Head Corporate Controlling Section. 
Anton Stadler, Head Analysis and Policy Division. 
Roland Steininger, Occupied Palestinian Territories 
Martin Stuerzinger, Nepal 
Lorenzo Suarez, Programme Officer Hindu Kush. 
Sybille Suter, Head of Latin America Division.  
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Maya Jaouhari Tissafi, Deputy Director General and Head Regional Cooperation.  
Christine Tobler, Liaison Officer and Deputy Chief of Staff.  
Armin Ullmann, Humanitarian Aid. 
Edita Vokral, Ambassador and Head of Cooperation, Haiti 
Frank Wiederkehr, Programme officer Afghanistan.  
 
Tajikistan 
H.E. Eduard Auer, EU Ambassador 
Nargis Bozorova, Director for Human Rights, Legal Reform and Access to Information, 
Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation. 
Severine Chappaz, Head of Mission. International Committee of the Red Cross. 
Rosa Charpentier, Development Coordinating Committee secretariat 
Kevin Dean, Deputy Country Office Director, USAID Tajikistan. 
Mouazzamma Djamalova, National Program Office Health Care, SDC. 
Henri Zipper de Fabiani, French Ambassador 
Yodgor Fayzov, Chief Executive Office, Aga Khan Foundation. 
Nicolas Guigas, Deputy Country Director, Swiss Cooperation Office (SECO). 
Husain Gulamhusein, Programme Support Officer. Aga Khan Development Network. 
Zeynal Hajiyev, Director, International Office of Migration Tajikistan. 
Farrukh Hamraliev, Minister, Economic Development and Trade, Republic of Tajikistan. 
Malika Ibrohimova, National Program Officer for Economic Affairs, SDC. 
Nassim Jawad, Coordinator. UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). 
Nashir Karmali, Executive Office. Focus Humanitarian Assistance. 
Jeffrey Lehrer, Country Representative, USAID 
Munir M. Merali, Resident Representative. Aga Khan Development Network. 
Manuel Micaller, Jr., First Secretary, Political and Economic Affairs, U.S. Embassy, 
Tajikistan. 
Peter Mikula, Copuntry Director, Swiss Cooperation Office (SDC). 
Christopher Miller, Country Officer, International Finance Corporation. 
Parviz Mullojnov, Political Analyst, Tajik civil society 
Stephan Nellen, Ambassador, Embassy of Switzerland to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.  
Shakarbek Niyatbekov, National Program Officer Rule of Law, SDC. 
Marsha Olive, Director, World Bank. 
Davlatali Saidov, Chairman, State Committee on Investments and State Property 
Management, the Republic of Tajikistan. 
Ruslan Sadykov, National Program Officer for Infrastructure, SDC. 
Joji Tokeshi, Country Director. Asian Development Bank. 
Zahira Virani, Country Director, United Nations Development Program in Tajikistan. 
Alexander Zuev, Resident Coordinator, United Nations in Tajikistan. 
Saforali Zokirov, Governor and Chairperson, and local development committee, 





Gaspard Byukusenge, executive secretary, Rutsiro District. 
Elzabeth Carriere, Head of Office. DFID Rwanda and Burundi.  
Nicolas Charpentier, Programme Director. Handicap International. 
Jean Marc Clavel, Regional Director Great Lakes, SDC. 
Enata Dusenge, Director General, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. 
M. Michel Gatete, SWAP coordinator, Ministry of Health. 
Professor Simon Gasibirege, Coordinator, Institut Africain pour la Pysychologie Integree. 
Marie Gilbrin, Deputy Country Director, SDC. 
Sebastien Hakizimana, Vice Mayor in charge of Finance and Economic Development. 
Karongi District. 
Andrea Hensel, Development Counsellor. Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Bernard Kayumba, Mayor, Karongi District. 
Lewis Mudge, Researcher, Human Rights Watch. 
Immaculee Mukankubito, Second Deputy Director, Institute of Research and Dialogue for 
Peace. 
Dr Uzziel Ndagijimana, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health. 
Jocelyne Niyodushima, PSP, SDC. 
Ronald Nkusi, Director, External Finance Unit. Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning. 
Jacques Pitteloud, Ambassador, Embassy of Switzerland to Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi 
and Permanent Representative to the United Nations Environment Programme. 
Dr Fred Smiet, First Secretary Regional Affairs. Embassy of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands. 
Claire Lise Temporal, SDC. 
Cyrille Turatsinze, Permanent Secretary. Ministry of Local Government. 
Jaky L. Villettaz, Head of Delegation. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 
Nils Warner, Head of German Development Cooperation Rwanda/ Burundi. 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Jean-Baptiste Baciyunjuze, Celestin Kelenga Selemani and Evariste Kaji, VOVOLIB 
Laetitia Courtois, Head of sub-delegation, ICRC. 
Jean Baptiste Safari, IFDP 
Deo Bashi, CDJP 
Michel Dubois, Head of Office, UNDP South Kivu 
Gisele Batembo Faida, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, South Kivu. 
Joll Kamuntu Ntabunge, Director, Radio Maendeleo. South Kivu. 
Laban Kyalangalilwa Kashande, Minister of Provincial transport, Communication and 
Tourism, South Kivu. 
Jos Van Mierlo, Programme Coordinator, South Kivu. Malteser International 
Abbe Justin Nkunzi, Director for the Commission Justice and Peace. Arch-diocese of 
Bukavu. 




Dr Bonaventure Savadogo, Swiss TPH, Uvira. 
Lothar Seethaler, Head of Cooperation, SDC. 
 
Burundi 
Dave Beer, Resident Representative, DFID Burundi.  
Dirk Brems, Minister Counsellor. Embassy of Belgium 
Oliver Hoehne, PDIV, FDFA. 
Damien Macumi, Unite de Coordination. 
Dr Barnabe Mahenehene, Ministry of Health. 
Jean Marie, Director General, Ministry of Community Development. 
Leo Naescher, Technical Counsellor of the Executive Secretary. International Conference 
on the Great Lakes Region. 
Louis-Marie Nindorera, Country Director, Global Rights. 
Thomas Ntambu-Kakoma, Initiatives and Change International. 
Loukas Petrides, Head of Delegation. ICRC. 
Claudio Tognola, Director, SDC. 
 
Other 
Peter Maurer, State Secretary, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. 
Sarah Cliffe, UN Peace 
Sypros Demetriou, World Bank 
James Rogan, UNICEF 
Joanna Macrae, DFID. 
James Darcy, ODI. 
Rolan Salvisberg, Head, Peace Policy. Europe, Asia, Mediation, Democratisation. Political 
Affairs Division IV.  
Jean Luc Bernasconi, SECO. 
Daniel Kessler, KEK CDC Consultants. 




Annex 6: Tajikistan case study on the performance of SDC 




The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) is presently developing its new 
Federal Council Dispatch 2013-2016 (Botschaft). As part of the new strategic direction 
envisaged in the dispatch, the organisation‘s leadership is committed to increasing 
engagement in fragile states. Currently the proposal is that it increases from 28% of its 
budget (currently) to 40-50% to be more in line with the international donor ―average‖, 
 
As a result, the SDC Directorate has mandated the Corporate Controlling Section to 
commission an evaluation of the performance of SDCs instruments in fragile and conflict-
affected contexts. The evaluation uses a primarily qualitative approach, combining interviews, 
case studies and document review. It is intended to be ―developmental‖, meaning that in 
addition to fulfilling the accountability function, it also places a high emphasis on ―learning‖, 
and in particular the usefulness (or ―usability‖) of the recommendations. 
 
An important component of this evaluation is the reflective inquiry process with stakeholders 
in case study cooperation offices, both internal SDC staff, as well as partners working closely 
with the SDC cooperation office, including recipients of assistance, the broader donor 
community, civil society and the host government. The case study (and the evaluation 
generally) follows four specific lines of inquiry: Performance; Analysis, Flexibility and 
Adaptability; Complementarities of SDC Mandates; and SDC‘s Role in the Broader System. 
 
This Tajikistan case study is one of two substantive studies, with the other in the African 
Great Lakes region. They will be complemented by a further 4 or 5 desk studies. The case 
study will assess the performance of the various instruments deployed in Tajikistan, providing 
a solid base of evidence of where SDC now stands in some of the world‘s most fragile 
contexts, and an analysis of where it needs to improve. This case study will also be used to 
assist global SDC to develop priorities for change and provide actionable recommendations 
for future engagement in fragile contexts. 
 
The Tajikistan case study involved field visits to seven project sites in four different regions. 
This included visits to a Prevention of Domestic Violence field office, meeting with both staff 
and victims; the project office of a new health program supporting the establishment of family 
medicine services throughout the country; a family medicine clinic in Kurgan-tube, meeting 
with the Director, family medicine practitioners and patients: and a meeting with the Governor 
of this district and the staff of the Local Development Committee (LDC) in Muminabad, a 
multi-stakeholder platform at the district level where representatives from government and 
civil society can meet and pursue common development objectives through mutual dialogue. 
The team also visited Khorog in the Pamir with the Director of the Aga Khan Development 
Network Foundation (AKDNF) to visit programs co-financed by the Cooperation Office 
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(COOF)1 in partnership with the AKDNF including Pamir Energy, which provides 24 hour 
energy to the poor communities of the Pamir, and its innovative customer service and support 
program, meeting both staff and consumers. 
 
Interviews were conducted with all of SDC Tajikistan‘s National Program Staff and four of five 
international staff in county. In addition, thirty four external partners were interviewed, 
including Government of Tajikistan (GoT) Ministers, a provincial Governor, Ambassadors of 
France, the European Union and the Charge‘ de Affaires of the US Embassy, donors, 
international financial institutions, program implementers, civil society, media, private sector 
businesses and assistance recipients. A Workshop was held on the final day of this two-week 
Mission to present and validate findings, explore emerging themes together and elicit staff 
feedback on approaches to address Tajikistan‘s fragility. 
 
Tajikistan’s “Fragility” Context 
 
Is Tajikistan ―fragile‖ and, if so what are the factors that constitute its fragility?  Much has 
been written about Tajikistan‘s fragility.  Its post-Soviet history certainly defines a trajectory 
that encompasses war, social service degradation, a non-existent civil society, serious human 
rights violations, a heavy-handed autocracy and an unsustainable economy. 
 
SDC has undertaken a number of recent studies on Tajikistan‘s fragility.  In the February 
2010 Vulnerability Assessment of the Cooperation Office (COOF) in Tajikistan, the study 
stated that, ―By anyone‘s standards, the fragility of Tajikistan is increasingly brittle, 
characterized by the current degradation of the political, economic, social and service delivery 
system, weak private sector structure, lack of liquidity of the banking sector, the decay of the 
agricultural sector, high levels of nepotism and corruption compounded by the weakening role 
of civil society, poverty and centralization of power in the hands of cronies.  However, 
Tajikistan is not a failed state, but there is urgent necessity to address Tajikistan‘s fragility.‖ 
 
A 2011 Tajikistan Context Analysis by SDC consultants states that, ―The political governance 
in Tajikistan is based on one side on a presidency relying on and supported by a clannish rule 
and extensive corruption system and on the other hand on a range of legal provisions more 
or less imposed by the international community and rewarded with foreign aid.  Although the 
constitution provides for checks and balances and leaves space both for political opposition 
and democratic change of government, detailed provisions such as the extensive 
appointment prerogatives of the president leave little space for challenging the decisions or 
interests of the head of state and its close relatives.‖ 
 
An August 2011 paper on Civil Society in Tajikistan identified, ―a growing divide between the 
Government and the population as a major contributory factor of fragility in Tajikistan.‖ 
 
                                               
1
 The Cooperation Office in Tajikistan is joint between SDC, SECO and PDIV. To avoid messy nomenclature, and 
in the interests of readability, this case study uses COOF to represent the joint entity, and only refers to SDC when 
a point is being made specifically about that agency. 
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Clearly, Tajikistan is a fragile context, (and the myriads of studies and analyses of this 
country as well as all of the interviews during this Mission came to this same conclusion), 
further analysis of the ―Country Context‖, which follows, supports this assessment. 
 
Emergence of the State:  Tajikistan became an independent, sovereign state in 1991 after 
the break-up of the Soviet Union and less than a year later became engulfed in a disastrous 
civil war from 1992-1997, with Islamists and liberal democratic reformers fighting the Russia-
backed government.  50,000 Tajiks were killed and over 700,000 people fled the country, 
including most of the ethnic Russians.  The war ended with a UN-brokered peace agreement 
signed by today‘s President Rahmon and opposition leader Nuri. 
 
Population:  Today, Tajikistan is a country with a population of close to 7.4 million.  About 
50% of this population is under 14 years of age.  This is significant for a number of reasons. 
This means that this generation of young people—half the population—have no memory of 
the civil war, the efficient service delivery system under the Soviets and the excellent 
education system, which is now only a shadow of its former self.  As the number of poor 
continues to grow, and service delivery, especially education, worsens, this new generation of 
youth could turn again to civil disturbance or war, out of alienation from and frustration with 
the government.   
 
Migration & Remittances:  In addition to the internal population of Tajikistan, it is estimated 
that some 1.2 million Tajiks live abroad, in either Russia or Kazakhstan.  According to the 
World Bank and IMF, remittances from these migrant workers were estimated at 40% of 
Tajikistan‘s GDP for 2010, or over $2.4 billion, from an average wage of $420 per month.  
According to many of our interviews, these remittances financed almost 70% of Tajikistan‘s 
trade deficit, increased the National Bank‘s international reserves by some $125 million and 
helped support a noticeable decline in poverty, constituting 25% of the income of those living 
in rural areas.  No question that remittances do serve as an important lifeline for the country.  
If Russia decides to pursue a more conservative approach, limiting the numbers of migrants 
or eliminating them all together, this too could have serious negative effects on the economic 
and social fabric of Tajikistan. 
 
Poverty:  Tajikistan, according to the World Bank and the UNDP Human Development Index, 
remains the poorest country in Central Asia and the CIS.  While those living under the poverty 
level of  $1.40 per day, as defined by the IMF, decreased from 83 percent of the population in 
1999 to 47 % in 2009, this still high level of poverty creates continuing pressure on the GoT‘s 
social service delivery mechanisms, demonstrated by a drop in school enrollment for girls and 
diminishing health services throughout the country.  The implications of this extreme poverty 
means that Tajikistan is one of the few countries in Central Asia unlikely to meet most of its 
Millennium Development Goals, including access to improved water and sanitation facilities in 
rural areas, health services to address high maternal mortality rates, decreasing quality of 
education, lack of reliable social safety nets, decreasing quality of skills training and 






Health & Education:  Both indicators have deteriorated since the end of the civil war.  Both 
sectors‘ indicators are the lowest in the region.  The GoT spends 1.14 percent of GDP on 
health, while out of pocket health expenditures by individuals is the highest in the region.  
There is some good news though. Under-five mortality rates are decreasing and infant 
mortality rates have decreased from 89 per live births in 2000 to 65 in 2005.  In education, 
enrollment for 14 year old has increased from 88 percent in 2007 to 95 percent in 2009.  
However, higher education is largely inaccessible to poorer families and the entire system 
experiences a dramatic shortage of qualified teachers.  You now find that the older 
generation, educated under the Soviets, have a higher level of education than the younger 
generation, struggling under the prevailing Tajik system.  And both sectors‘ impact on 
Tajikistan‘s fragility is severe.  Educated Tajiks leave both the government and their country.  
The education system can not support capacity building required to train Tajiks to become the 
best and the brightest and to ensure that Tajiks are equipped to responsibly address the 
health needs of themselves and their families, to effectively voice their concerns and to 
support the social and economic development of their country.  Brain drain and marginal 
health care will at best maintain Tajikistan‘s underdevelopment and, at worst, support the 
continuation of its fragility. 
 
The Economy:  The recent June 2011 IMF Mission to Tajikistan concluded that the country 
continues to recover from the global economic crisis. While GDP growth fell to 3.9 percent in 
2009, it recovered to 6.5 percent in 2010 and real GDP growth is estimated to be 6 percent 
by the end of 2011.  This growth was dependent on an increase in prices of Tajikistan‘s two 
top exports, aluminium and cotton, as well as a rebound in remittances, which increased by 
38 percent the first half of 2011.  While continued growth prospects are good, risks abound 
that would impact Tajikistan‘s fragile context.  Price increases in energy and food will 
exacerbate inflation, negatively affecting the small gains the country has made in poverty 
reduction.  Lack of structural reforms to address corruption and allow the nascent private 
sector to emerge would also be a continuing drag on the economy.  Back sliding on GoT-
proposed tax reforms and enhanced transparency of state-owned enterprises could lead to a 
stalled business environment and a macroeconomic framework that would remain fragile. 
 
Private Sector Development:  According to the World Bank‘s September 2011 Program 
Snapshot for Tajikistan, the country‘s biggest challenge in the coming years will be lifting its 
low rates of private investment.   Private investment in this economy has only been a 
disappointing 5 percent of GDP over the past decade.  However, the government has been 
responsive of late in undertaking some positive steps to create a viable and robust private 
sector.  It has eliminated cumbersome and redundant procedures required in the past to open 
a business, and has established a one-stop shop for business licensing.  It has lowered 
corporate income tax rates, passed new laws to create a credit bureau for private business, 
streamlined the insolvency law, and improved the protection of minority shareholders in 
businesses. 
 
Governance and Civil Society:  Tajikistan is still reeling from its civil war, as this war 
depleted much of the country‘s human capacity.  Without this capacity, the government has 
been extremely challenged in meeting its overall development objectives and this has most 
severely impacted governance throughout the country. As pointed out earlier in this paper, an 
October 2011 paper by SDC Tajikistan pointed out that the ―growing divide between the 
Government and the population is a major contributory factor of fragility.‖  There is a clear 
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need to mainstream good governance at all levels of government, as well as within all donor 
programs and projects.  This will help strengthen transparency and accountability as well as 
support the critical need for enhanced capacity in both the public and private sectors.  This 
will also have a positive impact on corruption, an aspect of Tajik life that continues to drain 
the economy at the expense of much needed pluralistic governance. 
 
The Competing Narratives: What We Heard in our Interviews 
 
From our extensive interviews discussing Tajikistan‘s fragile context, a number of competing 
narratives have emerged that represent the opinions of our interviewees, all of whom are 
engaged in the development of Tajikistan, on the future of this country.  We believe these 
different approaches can be extremely useful to SDC as the Agency evaluates its instruments 
in these fragile contexts. 
 
The first is the Rahman-bashi.  Under this scenario, the prevailing autocracy deepens, an 
opinion shared by many interviewees.  The international community hastens its departure 
from the country; the family tightens its grip and takes more control of the state, both at the 
local and national level.  Russia, concerned about civil strife in Tajikistan, sends its Tajik 
population of labourers back to Tajikistan and stops the issuance of visas for Tajik‘s wishing 
to work in Russia.  New unemployment creates large-scale instability within the country; 
desecularization increases as more Tajiks look toward their Islamic religion for a support 
system and radical Islam expands.  Nacro-traffickers expand their territory and ties with 
Afghan drug wholesalers increase. 
 
The second scenario is the slow collapse.  Corruption expands unabated, fuelled by a 
disregard for governance at all levels and first-family greed, as the Talco aluminium plant 
remains a priority at the expense of support for nation-wide employment, poverty alleviation 
and private sector enhancements.  Migration to Russia and Kazakhstan increases, creating 
an even more severe brain drain with the country.  Degradation of both physical and human 
infrastructure continues as resources for both human capacity development and infrastructure 
required to stimulate the economy flow in the direction of those in power.  Poverty worsens, 
leading to a worsening of health and education indicators.  Tajikistan finds itself extremely 
vulnerable to economic shocks, not unlike the near collapse of 2007-2008.  And civil strife 
deepens, led by a new generation of Tajik‘s who don‘t remember what their country was like 
during the civil war. 
 
The third can be characterized as bumping along the bottom.  With this scenario we find 
the ―same old, same old.‖  The country remains stable, but little to no economic growth 
occurs.  The international community remains, but maintains its current direction.  It does not 
play a role promoting decentralized government, an enhanced role for civil society, 
transparency and new private sector investments.  Essentially, Tajikistan remains as it is 
currently.  The Tajik population is neither pessimistic, nor optimistic.  They, as many said in 




The fourth scenario is recognition that transition takes time.  Tajiks, as well as the 
international community, see slow improvement.  The country takes ―two steps forward, one 
step backwards‖, but forward momentum is clearly indicated.  The government views a 
loosening of the economy through increased private investments, as in its best interest.  Civil 
society has a greater role in governance at the local level. Reformers emerge within the 
government, allowing more public and private sector freedom.  Ten years from now, Tajiks 
are more optimistic and see that their economy is on the right track.  However, social 
indicators still remain poor, with little progress in either the health or education sectors. 
 
The last scenario is “Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom”.  Reforms begin to take hold and 
benefit the country.  The economy finally booms through privatization and an emergent 
private sector.  The country takes energy independence seriously and begins to attract more 
private investment, both domestic and international, to this critical sector.  The government 
formulates plans for the privatization of Nurek and Rogun hydropower stations, as well as 
Talco aluminium plant. Regional relationships improve and trade expands regionally with its 
Central Asia neighbors and Russia.  The prevailing autocracy moves closer to democratic 
values and allows pluralism to flourish.  The education system expands to include a viable 
vocational education program, stemming the brain drain as more qualified Tajiks find jobs 
within their country‘s private and public sectors. 
 
These five scenarios not only reflect a wide divergence of opinion but, as important, embody 
an important set of prevailing characteristics of fragility in Tajikistan which the COOF can 
utilize in the design of instruments that will have a positive impact on this country‘s and other 
fragile countries‘ development as well.   
 
Through our extensive interview process, Tajikistan‘s fragile context can be defined as 
follows:  
 
While the State is stable, as internal security is better now than at any time since the civil war 
and there is virtually no crime, an empowered civil society is non-existent. 
Governance is weak and corrupt at both the national and local levels. Technical capacity to 
enable Tajik‘s to run their government efficiently and effectively is non-existent.  A lack of 
will to implement far-reaching reforms exists throughout government.  Government 
reformers are virtually unknown. 
Service delivery, especially with the health and education sectors, is marginal at best.  
Under the former Soviet state, services were adequate and provided to all.  Tajiks were used 
to efficient State provision.  Now the State is unable to deliver even basic services. 
The economy is highly “brittle” and subject to both internal and external shocks.  The 
economy is primarily dependent on Talco aluminium, an industry that drains over 45% of 
Tajikistan‘s total energy supply, and remittances from Tajiks in Russia, providing over 45% of 
the country‘s GDP. Both of these economic inputs are highly fragile and economic collapse 
could happen suddenly. The agriculture sector is primarily led by cotton and its production 
methods remain inefficient., redirecting water resources from other more cost effective and 
productive crops.  
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Tajikistan’s proximity to Afghanistan, sharing a 1300-kilometer border to its south, is a 
factor discussed by most interviewees.  Spill over effects from nacro-trafficking are already 
negatively impacting the social and economic fabric of Tajik life.  Another concern is the 
potential destabilizing effect of NATO‘s 2014 pull-out of forces from Afghan soil.  Will the 
Taliban advance north across the border?  Will there be an emergence of radical Islam within 
Tajikistan as a result of a new Taliban government to the south?  Will existing trade linkages 
be severed between the two countries by isolationist policies of the Taliban? 
Regional disputes with neighbors to the north and south affect Tajikistan‘s fragility.  By 
leaving the Central Asia electricity grid in 2009, Uzbekistan effectively cut off Turkmenistan 
electricity that flowed to Tajikistan through Uzbekistan.  Uzbekistan also stopped its natural 
gas exports to Tajikistan.  Ethnic disputes between the Kyrgyz, Tajiks and Uzbeks continue to 
ferment.   Afghanistan remains a critical concern, in anticipation of the withdrawal of foreign 
troops in 2014.  And China continues to increase its presence through economic investments 
and infrastructure development with still unknown consequences as China‘s footprint 
increases throughout Central Asia. 
 
In conclusion, six factors are highlighted for the Tajikistan COOF to consider in their future 
planning that will have an impact on Tajikistan‘s fragility include: 
 
Rahman and succession: democratic pluralism vs. autocracy and isolation. 
Corruption: Does the private sector emerge or will civil strife ensue? 
Migration and Russia; the impact on Tajikistan if Russia changes its prevailing immigration 
policies. 
Climate change: the impact on water resources, agriculture and energy. 
Afghanistan and NATO’s departure: strategic importance to Tajikistan, contagion, terrorism, 
instability and narco-trafficking. 
China: infrastructure and trade. 
 
The analysis outlined above suggests some key areas of concentration for aid donors 
thinking about how to positively impact the factors of fragility: 
Pluralistic politics supporting good governance and the rule of law 
Effective and responsive local level service delivery, especially health and education 
―It‘s the economy stupid‖—setting business free, sound macro-economic financial 
management, enabling infrastructure, creation of jobs, containment of corruption 
Water resource management and disaster resilience 
Enhancing stability and security, both internally and externally 
 
Interestingly, these are extremely similar to the five new Peace-building and State-building 
Goals (PSGs) agreed at the Busan conference on aid effectiveness and suggested by the 
G7+ grouping of fragile states. These are 1) legitimate politics, 2) security, 3) justice, 4) 





SDC Tajikistan‘s development framework is implemented within the Swiss Cooperation 
Strategy for the Central Asia Region 2007-2011.  This regional strategy also includes 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.  According to the Cooperation Office (COOF), given the 
interrelationships between the development priorities of these three Central Asian countries, 
a regional approach is ―applied in the strategic planning of technical and financial 
cooperation.‖  However, national programming is also advocated.  ―Think regionally—
implement nationally‖ is the modus operandi currently being followed.   
 
For the region, and, in this context, for Tajikistan, five specific ―domains of intervention‖ 
constitute the region‘s, and the national program‘s, framework for development.  These 
include: health care reform; water management and disaster risk reduction; basic 
infrastructure; private sector development; and public services and institutions.  Governance 
and gender are considered cross cutting components of all five of these program themes. 
The current 2007-2011 strategy ends December 2011, and the new SDC Strategy for Central 
Asia 2012-2015 will commence in 2012. 
 
Highlighting the specific ―domains of intervention‖ of the current 2007-2011 program, the 
health program has focused on the establishment of family medicine services, improved 
health financing methods and health sector reform through policy dialogue with the GoT. 
 
The basic infrastructure program has supported both the water and energy sectors.  Water 
has targeted water supply in urban and rural communities. The energy program has 
supported procurement of electricity meters and subsidies to the poor for the procurement of 
electricity. Dialogue with the GoT on energy construction, rehabilitation and privatization 
continues. 
 
The private sector development program has addressed policy and regulatory reform 
through on-going policy dialogue and directed technical assistance to the Ministries involved 
in this sector.  Policy support for the simplification of taxation procedures, including the 
development of a new tax code to encourage small and medium enterprise development 
continues. 
 
The public institutions and services program has supported both national and provincial 
government. At national level the National Bank and the Ministry of Finance were supported 
to develop a viable and financially sound government securities market. Support was 
provided to develop a transparent, efficient accounting system for public institutions.  WTO 
accession support has also been provided through the Ministry of Economic Development 
and Trade. 
 
At provincial level the COOF program concentrated on decentralised planning and provision 
of services in Muminabad district. This involved setting up a development council consisting 
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of authorities and local civil society (which has subsequently become an NGO) and 
programming significant resources through these at a local level. 
 
The Tajikistan COOF‘s rule of law program has supported capacity building for civil society 
organizations, most notably those supporting abused women through domestic violence.  
This program also supports capacity building at the Judicial Training Center and the 
incorporation of domestic violence training into the curricula of the National Police Academy. 
 
The disaster risk reduction program supports the integration of disaster risk reduction into 
both national and district level development projects.  A new national risk assessment 
methodology has been instrumental in assisting the GoT to prioritize risk mitigation 
investments, leading to substantial cost savings. 
 
The COOF is now in the process of developing its 2012-2015 cooperation strategy.  This new 
2012-2015 strategy, while still regional, will take into account the prevailing, country-specific 
differences that have emerged over the past strategy period.  Specifically for Tajikistan, these 
include: 
 
Achievement of MDGs not a good story: education levels decreasing; new onset of and 
spread of infectious diseases; higher prevalence of malnutrion; food insecurity increasing; 
increasing unemployment; quality of drinking water worsening; deterioration in sanitation; 
higher maternal and child mortality rates. 
 
16% of the population has no access to clean drinking water. 
 
Infrastructure remains substandard because of poor management and lack of  
resources. Roads and rail embody high operating costs and low speeds. Energy system 
suffers from high losses and low reliability. 
 
A nascent private sector still exists. 
 
Poverty has been reduced from 83.4% of the population in 1999 to 47.2% in 2009, but most 
of the other economic indicators are moving in the wrong direction. 
 
Revenues were 15% less than planned for in the approved 2010 budget; current account 
deficit increased to 10% of GDP in 2010; balance of payments financing gap was $45 million. 
 
Government reform priorities include land, health care, public finance management, and 
water and energy reform, but few results and few reformers within the government. 
 
Little positive impact on real lives of real people—yet. 
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The Tajikistan team is now working on the development of the new Tajikistan 2012-2015 
Swiss Cooperation Strategy.  The new program strategy will consist of Urban and Rural 
Drinking Water; Health Care Reform, Private Sector Development, and the Rule of Law.  
Energy, Public Finance Management and Macroeconomics will be phased out and Disaster 
Risk Reduction will be incorporated into the regional Water Management program.  According 
to the Annual Report, November 2011, the Tajikistan COOF will incorporate Conflict Sensitive 
Program Management into all of its new programs; will mainstream Disaster Risk Reduction 
into its new projects; and will integrate Youth into new program designs, recognizing that 
more than 50% of Tajikistan‘s population is 18 years of age or younger. 
 
Performance of Instruments 
 
The COOF Tajikistan‘s current program has been implemented as a component of the Swiss 
Cooperation Strategy for Central Asia 2007-2011.  An assessment prior to the initiation of the 
current strategy found that the previous program was too broad and fragmented, thus hard to 
supervise and manage.  In addition, the assessment pointed out that the governance strategy 
was also unfocussed and, therefore, obsolete.  The assessment also pointed out that the new 
program should build upon its successes and specified the health sector as one development 
need that demonstrated the Swiss‘ comparative advantage and should be a component of the 
new 2007-2011 program.  This advice was clearly well taken and health emerged as the 
leading sector over the past four years.   
 
The SDC Tajikistan health program contributed to positive trends in health indicators, 
including infant mortality, maternal mortality and improved access to health care facilities.  
The number of family doctors trained increased significantly, reaching one half of the total 
needed.  Geographic access to family medicine also increased significantly, now 
encompassing over 60% of the country.  As important, the program is now completely aligned 
with National Health Strategy and Switzerland was instrumental in the development of a 
Health Coordination Council, which, not only serves as a forum for national policy dialogue 
with the government, but also ensures government participation on all health policy working 
groups.  Even though the health sector remains woefully underfunded at 2% of GDP, which is 
the second lowest worldwide, the Swiss‘ health program has made a very positive 
contribution to this sector. 
 
The program assessment also suggested that another comparative advantage of Switzerland 
is in the energy sector. Through tariff subsidies and the provision of new electric metering, 
electricity losses decreased and the geographic area of provision increased significantly.  
However, governance issues on the part of the state regarding pricing and internal 
management remain poor.  Until the government makes major changes in the management 
of this sector, donor-led interventions will continue to be marginal at best.  Support to Pamir 
Energy, through the Aga Khan Network, continues to be a success, but the entire sector 
needs restructuring. 
 
Support to the water sector was another significant component of the last four-year program, 
and will remain so under the new strategy.  Twenty-four hour potable water is now provided 
to residents of second largest city, Khudjand.  Payment collection rate for water increased 
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from 60% to 90%.  Rural water supply is now a national model for delivery and pricing 
through the Swiss-supported Water Users Associations.  Scaling up this model of 
decentralized ownership and good governance will be a priority under the new strategy. 
 
The SECO program has demonstrated success in both private sector development and 
macro economic policy.  Policy dialogue with the government has led to enhanced 
government-donor cooperation in taxation reforms.  Transparency on business permits and 
procedures improved significantly through a new business registry platform.  Swiss support 
regularized tax credit procedures, and simplified business registrations.  The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) accession process demonstrated significant progress through Swiss 
technical support.  And Swiss financing supported the IMF‘s review of the National Bank‘s 
internal auditing procedures, leading to increased transparency critical for private sector-led 
economic growth.   
 
At the provincial level the SDC program also historically supported decentralisation of 
services, creating district development councils that combined state and civil society to 
prioritise development. This was then backed with a significant budget to implement the 
priorities chosen. This model is one of a number now under consideration by central 
government to be scaled up across the country. 
 
In the Rule of Law domain, the government approved its first judicial and legal reform 
program, with assistance from Switzerland.  However, the lack of a true civil society is an 
impediment to the effective implementation of this program.  There has been some progress 
supporting victims of domestic violence, as the number of victims of domestic violence 
seeking assistance almost tripled between 2009 and 2011. Domestic violence training was 
also integrated into Police Academy training curricula and a Swiss-supported working group 
from civil society developed draft law on domestic violence for Parliament.  Judicial training 
has also seen some progress, as over 160 judges were trained through Swiss technical 
assistance. 
 
Disaster Risk Reduction is the remaining domain of intervention.  Disaster prevention and 
response programs have been implemented in 16 pilot districts, which can serve as a 
national model. The Unified National Risk Assessment Methodology piloted in the South 
could serve as a national model and the government began to integrate disaster risk 
reduction into its development programs, despite the lack of capacity within government staff 
and resource constraints affecting long-term sustainability. 
 
The Tajikistan program has had a positive impact in all of the sectors it has worked in. Family 
doctors have been trained and are providing health care, water supply in Khujand (2nd city) 
has been significantly improved for 40,000 people, business process reduced, legal advice 
provided and disaster committees formed. Despite these practical results however, there is a 
sense that a lack of government willingness and capacity renders them less than optimal. The 
water supply project has made significant improvements to peoples lives but remains largely 
opportunistic – rather than part of structured development nationally. This is even more the 
case in the energy sector where despite massive improvements in collection of revenue (an 
excellent result), the problem of most of the national electricity going to the Aluminium plant 
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remains unresolved. The commitment of the Ministry of Health to the reforms is also 
lacklustre, delaying a planned move to more ―budget support‖ type programming. 
 
In the analysis of the country office, the COOF has been best at having impact on the micro 
and meso levels, and less effective in achieving macro-impact. Partly this has been because 
of strategy (less concentration on working with national government), but mostly it is the prevailing 
conditions, and the lack of unity in the donor community historically.  
 
This has led to a new focus on promoting donor coordination (see role in the system, below) and to 
more concentrated approach in the newly emerging 2012-2015 cooperation strategy. Whilst 
individually the programs were performing well, they were not adding up to a coherent change agenda, 
and were perhaps spread too thinly. A more concentrated approach might offer the possibility to 
capitalize on a positive interaction with a very small, but emerging, group of reformers within the Tajik 
government and the emergence of a donor group speaking with one voice and with one development 
agenda. 
 
As this new strategy evolves and its instruments are fully defined, considerable thought needs to be 
given to the sustainability of all of the emerging programs, and that they be consistently linked to the 
―macro‖ level.  Under the new strategy, this could entail senior level policy dialogue with the range of 
Ministries the program will continue to support, or with the President himself, as has been the case 
over the past year in conjunction with the Development Forum. Regarding sustainability, while there 
has been some progress in the past, the new strategy should incorporate a sustainability plan within 
every sector it is working. 
 
Conflict Sensitive Program Management (CSPM) is also being integrated into the entire program 




Switzerland‘s cooperation program in Tajikistan has made a solid contribution, with some 
demonstrable results.  
In general results have been more at the micro and meso- levels than at the macro level. 
The planned new strategic focus is needed to achieve transformative change. Switzerland has 
traditionally been in the right areas but spread to thin, and without sufficient policy linkage.  
 
Analysis, Flexibility and Adaptability 
 
The Tajikistan COOF‘s analytical and diagnostic work is generally done well. There are two important 
factors that are key to the analytical framework.  One is the national staff.  The COOF has extremely 
well qualified and well informed Tajik staff, with a good understanding of the conditions ―on the ground‖ 
and consistently good insight and analysis of the development context they were working within.  They 
are all significant assets to the overall program.  The second is the cadre of key contacts all of the staff 
nurture.  Both national and international staff maintain a deep and active group of outside contacts 




This has led to programme changes in the most recent strategy, as outlined in the performance section 
above, and for instance in initiatives such as disaster risk reduction mainstreamed into all new project 
designs. Another is recognizing the important role the under 18 youth will play in the future of the 
country and ensuring that this emerging role be a component of all of the domains of intervention.  
And, as discussed before, based on the staffs‘ broad-based understanding of the root causes of 
fragility and the role conflict plays in creating this fragile context, Conflict Sensitive Program 
management will be integrated throughout both the existing and new program.   
 
Despite this generally good level of analysis, and some adaptation in response to this, there is a 
general perception internally that programming is not sufficiently flexible (see also the conclusions 
section). Despite the rapid changes in the context in Tajikistan over the lifetime of SDC involvement, 
there is a feeling that the program has struggled to be responsive to these changes. Some of this is 
attributed to bureaucracy internally. 
 
As the new strategy moves forward, it is important to recognize the ―signals‖ from the external 
environment.  Tajikistan is a fragile context and fragility embodies constant change.  While the 
analytical framework employed by the COOF in Tajikistan is excellent, the signals that will continue to 
emerge from within the fragile context must be analyzed, understood and then incorporated into a 
development agenda, either existing or new.  This will require flexibility and even adaptations to the 
prevailing development agenda.  When circumstances change, enhanced flexibility in programs can 
only strengthen an emergent development response.  This is an excellent time (ending one strategy 
and beginning another) to embrace the notion of flexibility/adaptability and use these guiding principles 




The analysis of the cooperation office is done well. The national staff are an important asset in this 
regard, as is the network of contacts. 
This analysis has fed through into new themes in the forthcoming strategy, such as youth and the 
mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction. 
Despite this the pace of change of programmes and approaches is viewed by the staff as neither 




The Tajikistan program, which is the primary focus of this Case Study, operates under the Cooperation 
Strategy for the Central Asia Region 2007-2011.  The newly developing program for 2012-2015 will 
also be a component of the regional cooperation strategy.  Apart from Tajikistan, the regional strategy 
also encompasses Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.  The existing strategy (2007-2011) and the new 
strategy (2012-2015) were and are being developed through a joint effort between SDC and SECO.  
Both SDC and SECO funded the existing strategy and will fund the new strategy. 
 
While a ―regional strategy‖ is the working assumption for Switzerland, (and many other donors 
supporting Central Asia also embody regional approaches), there has been little ―regional 
complimentarity‖ within the Tajikistan program or within the region itself.  While these three countries 
share a past history of Soviet domination, today there are vast differences among the three—politically, 
ethnically, economically and socially.  Even the recommendations outlined in the Bern Head Office 
review of the current strategy stated, ―It has proven rather difficult to maintain links or achieve cross-
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fertilization between projects in the same sectors across the region.‖  Apart from occasional Central 
Asia-specific regional workshops on specific development sectors, like water and community 
mobilization, there been little ―regional‖ interaction among country-specific programs.  Nor has there 
any attempt to strategically align the three countries‘ programs, apart from the strategy document that 
is written every four years.  While personal contacts are maintained among staff in all three countries, 
there is little evidence of significant programmatic complimentarity or strategic alignment of the three 
Central Asia programs.  This begs the question of the importance of a ―regional strategy‖ as opposed 
to three separate and distinct ―county strategies.‖  
 
Although regional complimentarity has been difficult to achieve (mostly because of circumstance), 
there have been positive moves toward complimentarity of instruments within the cooperation office in 
Tajikistan.  This office operates under a clear mandate of ―cooperation‖, not as separate SDC, SECO 
and PD4 offices.  There is an integrated strategy both at regional and country level, and an integrated 
management structure within the cooperation office between SDC and SECO. The same is true for 
eastern cooperation (OZA) and humanitarian aid (HH) within SDC. There is an HH staff within the 
cooperation office and the HH programme is now on course to be mainstreamed throughout the 
development programme. 
 
The senior leadership also appeared to have both a substantive operational understanding of 
Tajikistan‘s key development issues, as well as an innate ability to work well among themselves.  The 
Ambassador responsible for Tajikistan has a close working relationship with the Country Director, 
considers him the senior Swiss official when the Ambassador is not in country (while responsible for 
Tajikistan, the Ambassador is also responsible for Kazakhstan and resides in Astana), and engages 
substantively with all program staff, national and international alike.  Not only is the Ambassador a 
strong supporter of the development agenda, he is also called upon to deliver important messages to 
the government and the donor community as well, on behalf of Swiss cooperation.  He plays a very 
positive role as an advocate for the work of the COOF in Tajikistan.  Clear cohesion of the Swiss 
government‘s mandates for Tajikistan strongly exists with this leadership team.  It is evident from our 
assessment that both foreign ministry (the Ambassador) and SDC cultures promote collaboration and 
comprehensive cooperation on development issues that define Tajikistan‘s fragile context. 
 
There has also been leverage of the role of the World Bank Executive Director (ED), who also has the 
responsibility of representing Tajikistan on World Bank issues.  The cooperation program has reached 
out to the ED on a number of development issues, including the macroeconomic policy reform agenda 
and the ED has collaborated closely with the country program as an important advocate for the 
COOF‘s development roadmap. 
 
While the new team and management in Dushanbe are intent on a holistic approach, more integration 
among programs will only strengthen their cooperation strategy and enhance the likelihood of having 
significant, positive and demonstrable impact.  Whilst the strategy is much closer to integration than 
many, it is still more a convenient co-existence of separate activities than a completely integrated 
vision. That said, it is clearly becoming more and more of the latter as time progresses. 
 
The program has a real opportunity at this point in time to fully integrate their programs, with the 
development of the next four-year strategy now underway.  Clearly economic development and the 
provision of basic services are intimately connected. Governance and the rule of law are paramount in 
Tajikistan and the key to reducing fragility. The support of reformers both inside government and in the 
small civil society is a very important part of this. SECO, SDC and PD4 working together on these 
connected issues – leveraging other donor support, and building state capacity where possible will lead 
to a greater impact. 
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The integration of CSPM into all projects; integrating disaster risk management into the water 
management program and mainstreaming disaster management into the entire portfolio are steps in 
the right direction.  With rule of law continuing in the new strategy, this is now an opportunity to more 
fully integrate the PD4 domestic violence program across all domains of intervention.  With water, 
health care reform and private sector development as the other priority sectors, these too can be better 
integrated around issues of financing, policy reform at the national level and advocacy for more 




Regional complimentarity has been difficult to achieve in practice given the deep rooted antagonisms 
between political elites in the region. 
The Tajikistan cooperation office is a model of collaboration in the Swiss system. All four instruments 
are co-located and work well together. There is good collaboration with the Ambassador in Astana. 
The strategy for Tajikistan is complimentary rather than integrated. The forthcoming regional strategy is 
a good opportunity to further deepen the inter-dependence of the instruments, given the clear inter-
dependence of the issues. 
 
Role in the System 
 
Switzerland is seen as a significant development actor in Tajikistan.  In interviews with senior 
government Ministers, multi-lateral donors, international financial institutions, bi-lateral donors, civil 
society, and project implementers and recipients of assistance, Switzerland was recognized as a major 
contributor to better donor coordination, working collaboratively within the complex, donor coordination 
framework, actively promoting donor coordination at both the program and national levels.  Switzerland 
was consistently recognized as an important member of the international community making a positive 
difference, as unwavering advocates for the importance of donors speaking with one voice to the 
Tajikistan government. 
 
This ―one voice‖ approach has evolved from the Development Coordination Council (DCC) that has 
been revitalized over the past year, in great part through enhanced COOF involvement.  The COOF 
Country Director (SDC) serves as a respected Council member and the Deputy Country Director 
(SECO) leads a subcommittee on financial reforms.  During our meeting with the Minister of Economy 
and Trade, he was recognized for his presentation that same day before the President on the status of 
economic reforms.  In our meeting with the State Investment Committee Chair, he posited that in the 
last two months, a new level of donor coordination has emerged. While a country partnership 
agreement had been signed two years ago with the donors, there had been little, if any action on this 
―partnership‖.  Now, the government is very encouraged and he emphasized the positive role of the 
new Swiss leadership.  In our discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), both recognized the importance of the DCC in bringing ―hard 
issues‖ directly to the President, and both commended the Swiss role on the DCC for its advocacy on 
ensuring that these issues remain at the top of DCC‘s agenda. 
 
While not the largest donor in terms of funding, Switzerland are highly respected for their engagement 
in the policy arena and their ability to ―leverage‖ their relatively small resources to co-finance important 
programs with the larger donors.  Through Swiss advocacy within the DCC, a tax subgroup was 
created to reform the existing tax regime and tax management, embraced by both the donors and the 
government.  Swiss-funded technical assistance and policy dialogue supported the on-going process 
of WTO accession.  Financed by SDC/SECO, the IMF managed the much-needed revisions of the 
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National Bank‘s internal audit procedures.  Through consistent Swiss-led policy dialogue, the 
government agreed to implement a national risk assessment methodology to assist in making financial 
sound decisions on disaster mitigation investments.  SDC is also promoting disaster risk management 
as an element of all sub groups with the DCC, to institutionalize disaster management across all 
development sectors. The Swiss are also the IFC‘s largest co-financing partner, leveraging Swiss 
resources to support private sector investments throughout Tajikistan. 
 
While the COOF in Tajikistan has played a very positive role in establishing a donor coordination 
mechanism that is working and, most notably, pursuing a ―one voice‖ approach with the government, 
the COOF can and should develop a stronger interconnectedness into the government.  The GoT is 
still the key actor in ensuring that reform continues and development objectives are met.  The COOF 
has excellent access to key government ministries and enjoys excellent access with certain 
government ―movers and shakers‖ (a position most of the donor community would not believe possible 
only a few months ago), but more can be done targeting programs directly to government.  Good 
relationships do exist with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy and Trade, but other 
ministries key to the COOF in Tajikistan‘s new strategy, like health and justice, still demand more 
directed assistance to ensure that reforms continue.  Much has been said about the COOF in 
Tajikistan‘s ―micro, meso and macro‖ approaches in support of Tajikistan‘s development.  Excellent 
interventions were demonstrated at the micro and meso levels.  More ―macro‖ interventions would 




Switzerland is a significant development actor in Tajikistan, and generally well regarded. 
Recent moves by the COOF leadership to promote donor coordination are much appreciated and have 
led to a far greater level of cohesion. This is an excellent role for Switzerland. 




The ―Conclusion‖ section will be summarized in two parts. The first are the 
ideas/suggestions/conclusions suggested by both Swiss and Tajik national staff during the internal 
wrap-up workshop held the last day of our Mission.  The second part will consist of a number of 
recommendations that emerged from our Mission. In addition, this evaluation into the work of SDC in 
fragile contexts is ―developmental‖ in nature, meaning that it is intended to be as useful as possible to 
practitioners. As a result, the conclusions are a mixture of the generic, of use to the organization and 
the evaluation generally, and more specific conclusions aimed at both the bi-lateral Tajikistan program 
and the regional strategy process. 
 
During the wrap-up workshop held on the last day of our Mission we met with all the program staff, as 
well as Ms. Anne Bichsel, SDC‘s staff from the Corporate Controlling Division, responsible for the 





Three questions were posed: 
 How much flexibility is there in programs and portfolios to change when circumstances 
change? 
 How can SDC programs in Tajikistan better engage with government to ensure that 
government is an active partner in program implementation, strengthening, not weakening civil 
society partners? 
 How do you view the future of Tajikistan and what SDC interventions can make a positive 
difference in the country‘s ―way forward‖? 
 
The responses to Question One were mixed.  A number of national staff believed there was little 
flexibility in programming. Reasons given included: funds were already committed; projects were 
already outsourced and contracts could not be broken; the project assessment and design process 
was too long and cumbersome; and even though the past history of Tajikistan was one of ―drastic 
changes‖, the SDC program ‗s ―bureaucracy‖ was too slow in responding to these changes, both in 
Dushanbe and at headquarters.  On the other hand, Swiss and some national staff believed the 
programs do have flexibility.  The ability to change in response to the emerging family medicine 
program was cited as one example.  Humanitarian aid was also cited as a flexible instrument, but 
usually outside the mainstream program.  Another was the COOF in Tajikistan‘s new leadership and 
his strong interest in refocusing the new strategy to national priorities.  But all recognized that the 
flexibility to change programs was difficult and more programs need to be targeted at both policy level 
work and much stronger support for the development of civil society. 
 
Regarding Question Two, a number of national staff believed the Cooperation Agreement from 1998 
needs to be revised from ―humanitarian‖ to ―development‖ and now be focussed on concrete domains 
of intervention.  In addition, specific Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) with Ministries should be 
signed to reflect concrete program priorities and to encourage the GoT to be more engaged in program 
implementation. (The Country Director did not agree with this approach). Most agreed that both 
additional financial and human resources would be required to support a more effective dialogue with 
the GoT and that capacity building assistance by donor-funded consultants embedded within 
government Ministries was essential.  Most recognized the important role the Donor Coordination 
Council was now playing in support of enhanced dialogue with the GoT and that the COOF should play 
a catalytic role in the further development of dialogue between civil society and the GoT.  Suggestions 
on how to increase the GoT‘s role included piloting more successful programs throughout the country; 
trust building within the framework of specific MOUs with Ministries, and; strengthening civil society 
through increasing the number of civil society-government forums more oriented toward results, not 
words. 
 
Question Three regarding the future of Tajikistan elicited the following responses from the Tajik staff: 
Tajikistan will remain fragile for a very long time. 
Economic or political freedoms are non-existent. 
The future role of both Russia and Afghanistan contribute to the unpredictability of Tajikistan‘s future. 
The country remains internally fragile and conflict-affected from external forces. 





And the more optimistic…. 
Tajikistan will have a brilliant future, as there still exists much untouched potential—but we need time. 
Five years ago the country was in the midst of a humanitarian crisis, and that was the focus of external 
assistance. Today we see more and more private investment and we have transitioned into a country 
in development. 
I am optimistic, but the government must reform for real and positive change to become a reality. 
Donors need to look more toward Tajiks for solutions, and Tajiks need to ask this question more and 
more—Do our children deserve to live here as we now know Tajikistan, or do they deserve better? 
Donors should already be crafting, with Tajiks, an exit strategy. 
We have much to learn from Switzerland and Switzerland can be our mentor as we move forward in 
reforming our government and meeting our developmental goals. 
 
In addressing these three questions the COOF staff, Swiss and Tajik alike, have demonstrated their 
strong commitment to both their work and, for the Tajiks, to their country.  Yet, how does this COOF 
program translate this commitment into the true comparative advantage for Switzerland working within 
this fragile environment?   
 
We would conclude, as would many Tajiks, that most Tajiks are neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but 
realistic about their future.  To be realistic about the future development of Tajikistan, it will absolutely 
critical to address ―fragility‖ in some way, and this is the challenge for the COOF.  As this case study 
has identified, there is a widely held body of thought that sees Tajikistan as a ―fragile state‖ and, as 
many still believe, a ―failed state‖.  These would be synonymous with the ―Rahman-bashi‖ or ―slow 
collapse‖ syndromes discussed earlier in this paper.  Another school of thought, and the one most 
closely held by the authors and the COOF inTajikistan country leadership, is that Tajikistan is not 
failing, but it is a fragile context, synonymous with ―stability but not growth‖, ―slow improvement over 
time‖, and then reforms begin to work, pluralism flourishes and the economy booms. 
 
Our conclusions/recommendations to ensure that the SDC/Tajikistan program fully utilizes its 
comparative advantages to enhance the impact of its program as it works within this fragile context are 
as follows: 
 
As the new 2012-2115 strategy develops, look more closely at all of the six factors identified earlier 
impacting Tajikistan‘s fragility (Rahman and succession; Corruption; Migration and Russia; 
climate change; Afghanistan, and; China) to, perhaps, fine tune the strategy to incorporate more 
of these important inputs. 
Fine-tuning the new strategy said, in another way, is to focus and concentrate the program.  This is 
a relatively small country with many development indices demanding more positive change.  Focusing 
on the drivers of instability that affect Tajikistan‘s fragility, as oppose to doing much of the same from 
the current 2007-2011 strategy, could achieve greater impact over the next four years.  This approach 
could certainly continue programs in urban and rural water, health care reform, private sector 
development and rule of law, but the other factors impacting fragility are also worth considering. 
Consider more carefully the value added of a regional program strategy.  Throughout the past 
strategy period, there has been little if any linkages between the three Central Asian Republics that 
constitute this ―regional‖ strategy.  The goals of cross-fertilization around key sectors like water and 
trade integration are certainly worthy, but there is little evidence that this has worked.  Three strong bi-
lateral programs without the regional overlay may prove more effective. 
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Humanitarian Assistance (HA), while not as relevant now as immediately after the civil war, is still an 
important component of the COOF‘s overall program to address fragility issues.  Yet, it was difficult to 
identify both specific programs currently being implemented and how the HA component was 
integrated into the COOF‘s overall program.  Rethinking the role of HA and how it can be more 
integrated into the ―Tajikistan‖ program could be useful. 
Leverage pilot programs to influence policy change.  A number of successful projects in water, 
health, domestic violence victims‘ support, energy, local development committees and economic 
framework development would all lend themselves to more expansive pilot/demonstration projects.  
Many of these projects are already in place, but ―joining up the dots better‖ will increase the overall 
program‘s impact.  This is also an opportunity for the Swiss to use the excellent relationships already in 
place with the other bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors and the political access Switzerland has with the 
few government reformers, to obtain support for these pilots and ensure their replicability.   
The Swiss COOF in Tajikistan and all its supporting programs need to work more consistently 
with the Government of Tajikistan.  We heard in many of our interviews that while the GoT is making 
small steps toward greater reforms, they still don‘t know how to go from A to B.  Switzerland can help.  
Working with the GoT is not an either/or proposition.  Proven Swiss expertise can help the government 
reform, without directing all or most of its resources through government.  It was clear in our interviews 
with senior government officials that this opening not only exists, but also grows exponentially with 
each and every positive Swiss-GoT interaction. 
Incorporate more “risk” assessment into the overall program’s portfolio.  Are programs high, 
medium or low risk investments?  If you are serious about obtaining the highest positive impact 
possible in addressing fragility, should there be more of a focus on higher risk programs?  High risk 
does equal high reward.  High risk also means there will be more failures.  Is it more effective to have a 
higher risk portfolio with some major, high impact successes, than a portfolio of low risk-low reward 
interventions? Taking on higher risk programs also means that the Swiss become more political. Is this 
the right direction to pursue in a fragile context? 
Switzerland should view Tajikistan as a major cooperation opportunity.  Based on our country 
interviews, Switzerland can be considered as one of the four major bi-lateral donors, with 
comparatively high political influence.  The SDC Country Director has excellent access with the few 
GoT reformers, is highly regarded among the diplomatic leadership and wider diplomatic community, 
and is viewed as a key leader within the Donor Coordination Council.  As Switzerland considers 
additional resources for fragile states, it may be time to capitalize on its influence and provide 
additional resources to this program focused on drivers of instability. 
 
1 
Annex 7: Great Lakes case study on the performance of SDC 




The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) is presently developing its 
new Federal Council Dispatch 2013-2016 (Botschaft). As part of the new strategic 
direction envisaged in the dispatch, the organisation‟s leadership is committed to 
increasing engagement in fragile states. Currently the proposal is that it increases from 
28% of its budget (currently) to 40-50% to be more in line with the international donor 
“average”, 
 
As a result, the SDC Directorate has mandated the Corporate Controlling Section to 
commission an evaluation of the performance of SDCs instruments in fragile and conflict-
affected contexts. The evaluation uses a primarily qualitative approach, combining 
interviews, case studies and document review. It is intended to be “developmental”, 
meaning that in addition to fulfilling the accountability function, it also places a high 
emphasis on “learning”, and in particular the usefulness (or “usability”) of the 
recommendations. 
 
An important component of this evaluation is the reflective inquiry process with 
stakeholders in case study cooperation offices, both internal SDC staff, as well as 
partners working closely with the SDC cooperation office, including recipients of 
assistance, the broader donor community, civil society and the host government. The 
case study (and the evaluation generally) follows four specific lines of inquiry: 
Performance; Analysis, Flexibility and Adaptability; Complementarities of SDC Mandates; 
and SDC‟s Role in the Broader System. 
 
This Great Lakes (Rwanda, Burundi, DR Congo) case study is one of two substantive 
studies, with the other in Tajikistan. They will be complemented by a further 4 or 5 desk 
studies. The case study will assess the performance of the various instruments deployed 
in the Great Lakes, providing a solid base of evidence of where SDC now stands in some 
of the world‟s most fragile contexts, and an analysis of where it needs to improve. This 
case study will also be used to assist global SDC to develop priorities for change and 
provide actionable recommendations for future engagement in fragile contexts. 
 
The Great Lakes case study involved visits to all three countries, and to project sites in all 
of those countries. The evaluator visited health and decentralisation projects in Rwanda, 
health and media projects in DR Congo and the Land Tenure project in Burundi, as well 
as interviewing partners in psychosocial in Rwanda and DR Congo. Ten SDC and PDIV 
national and international staff were interviewed, including the Regional Head of Office 
and the Ambassador in Nairobi. In total 38 external individual respondents were 
interviewed and six groups (consisting of another 35 people), from government (13), 






Great Lakes context 
 
SDC works in three countries in the Great Lakes region, Rwanda, Burundi and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Foreign Policy magazine publishes an annual list 
of “failed states”1, measured against a number of indicators such as economic decline, 
human rights and group grievances. Rwanda, Burundi and DRC score 34th, 17th and 4th 
respectively (with no.1 being the “most failed). It is clear then, that these are some of the 
most “fragile contexts” in the world. 
 
The nature of fragility in the region differs, but is intimately connected. The most obvious 
point of connection is the ethnic conflict that has dominated recent history in both Rwanda 
and Burundi. The genocide of Tutsis in Rwanda is the defining point in this history, with a 
million people killed and massive associated population movements. This in turn sparked 
conflict in the East of DRC, which has yet to be completely resolved. 
  
However, the history of conflict and the inter-related nature of this conflict goes much 
further. The troubled birth of the nation of DR Congo – then Zaire – is part of this history. 
The murder of independence leader Patrice Lumumba, the subsequent civil war in the 
context of the cold war all had their impact on their neighbours. Laurent Kabila was a rebel 
leader under whose nominal command Che Guevara fought in the Uvira region during this 
time against the troops of Moise Tshombe, supported at the time through Tanzania. 
Rwandan president Juvenal Habyiramana, whose assassination partly triggered the 
genocide, supported Hutu rebels against the Tutsi government in Burundi.  
 
What these partial examples usefully demonstrate is that events in one country quickly 
have repercussions for another. Former World Bank chief economist Paul Collier has 
estimated that the costs of civil war for a neighbouring country are $64bn and for the 
region the costs of a failed state in peacetime is $100bn2.  The graphic below shows this 




Whilst it is clearly the case that the “fragility” in the Great Lakes is regional as much as it is 
country specific, it is also worth noting the individual strengths and weaknesses of the 
three countries, not least because they are on slightly different trajectories in terms of 
economic development, security and conflict. 




 Collier, P (2007). The bottom billion. Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it. 
Oxford University Press. 
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Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
 Emerging from two decades of civil war, but peace still far from assured. Has the 
second largest UN peacekeeping mission in the world after Sudan, with some 19,000 
troops deployed.16 separate armed groups in South Kivu alone. Estimated 2.3 million 
internally displaced persons and 323,000 nationals as refuges outside the country. 
 Second round of elections underway as this case study was conducted. Peaceful 
elections with some consensus around the result will speed the consolidation of 
peace. 
 Countries emerging from civil war typically have high growth rates. Current economy 
is $12.65bn US dollars but with huge natural resources and a population of 60m in a 
territory the size of Europe there is massive potential for growth. Constraining this 
potential, DR Congo scores 168 out of 178 in transparency international‟s global 
corruption index, and ranks 178 out of 187 in the World Bank‟s ease of doing business 
report. 
 DR Congo has the lowest rank on the UNDP Human development index at 187 out of 
187.  During the war the US NGO International Rescue Committee (IRC) estimates 
that millions of people died – mostly due to lack of basic services – likening it to 
Africa‟s “first world war”. Eastern Congo is still routinely described as the “rape capital 




 Also emerging from a decade of civil war, with ongoing low-level insurgency. An 
estimated 300,000 people died in Burundi‟s civil war from 1993 to 2005. The Forces of 
National Liberation (FNL) commander Agathon Rwasa has fled to DR Congo and 
conflict continues between his group and the government. 
 Burundi‟s economy is tiny – at $1.42bn a year it is similar to the SDC budget. Burundi 
scores lower than DR Congo in transparency‟s corruption index at 172 out of 178, and 
is only marginally better for doing business at 169. It has registered relatively anaemic 
growth since 2005 (the official end of the conflict) at around 3% a year, compared with 
neighbouring Rwanda‟s 10% average, despite (or because of?) over 50% of the 
budget being external aid.  
 90% of Burundi‟s high density 8m population rely on rain fed subsistence agriculture 
for their main source of income, and coffee and tea constitute 90% of export earnings. 
 Burundi scored185th in the HDI out of 187. Will not achieve a single MDG by 2015. 
About 80 percent of the population suffers from food insecurity.  
 National poverty incidence stood at about 67 percent in 2006, a notable drop from 81 
percent in 1998, yet far from the 2015 MDG target of 18 percent.  
 Life expectancy rose from 43 years in 2000 to 51 years in 2010.    
 Decrease in under-five mortality rate by 20 percent from 2005 to 2009.   
 Primary education gross enrolment improved from 80% in 2003 to about 100% in 
2005, and more that 130% in 2009.  However, quality is low and completion rate is 




 Rwanda has made remarkable progress since the genocide and civil war of 1994. Its 
economy has boomed, posting averages of 10% per annum, it has processed 
hundreds of thousands of people accused of participating in the genocide and today 
has an enviable lack of insecurity and corruption. 
 Rwanda also had the 2nd highest global HDI growth between 2000 and 2011, with an 
average annual increase of about 2.92%, suggesting that to some degree economic 
and governance progress is translating into real change in people‟s lives. 
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 Nevertheless, 77% of Rwandans have an income that is below $1.25/day. Only Liberia 
and Burundi are worse. The DRC, which has the lowest HDI, has only 60% of the 
population living with an income less than $1.25/ day. Rwanda, like Burundi relies on 
agriculture and aid to keep it afloat. Rwanda is also one of the most unequal nations in 
the world with a Gini coefficient of 0.531. 
 Probably the greatest cause of Rwanda‟s fragility, beyond its neighbours (and with 
2,000 heavily armed FDLR former “genociders” in the forests of DRC, the threat from 
neighbours is significant), is its over reliance on one man. All respondents during the 
course of this case study talked of “strong leadership” as the key to Rwanda‟s 
success. Whilst the plan is certainly to build strong institutions to negate the need for 





The Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) programme in the Great Lakes has two 
strategic “axes”: health, and peace and governance. The health programme has two 
components – a main programme of support to the countries health system and a new, 
emerging programme of psychosocial support to victims of violence. The peace and 
governance programme primarily focuses on decentralisation in all three countries, land 
reform in Burundi and has a newer element of support for independent media. 
 
Peace and governance Health 
SDC regional cooperation: 4.4m CHF 
Political department IV: 2 m CHF 
SDC regional cooperation: 7.4m CHF 
SDC humanitarian aid: 8 m CHF 
TOTAL (regional): 21.8m CHF 
 
Table 1: regional budget 2010 (i.e. all three countries + regional programmes) for 
SDC and PD IV against the two strategic “axes”. 
 
The health system support programme represents the largest component of regional 
cooperation, as can be seen from table 1 above. In all three countries the programme 
focuses on support to a specific district, or districts, often with the intention of introducing 
new ways of working that have the potential to be scaled nationally. All three programmes 
contain elements of supply of equipment and essential drugs, equipment and capacity 
building for staff and administration. All three programmes have been implemented by the 
Swiss Tropical and Public Health Institute (Swiss TPH), although Rwanda is now directly 
implemented. Building a sustainable and self-supporting health system is at the heart of 
the programme philosophy. In addition to this country specific support there is a growing 
regional portfolio of psychosocial programming, aiming at sharing experience across the 
region as well as providing much needed support to victims of violence. 
 
Decentralisation in both Burundi and Rwanda has essentially focused on enabling local 
administration to deliver services. In all three countries there is a policy of 
decentralisation, and SDC has supported this – in Burundi there has also been support to 
the national Ministry for decentralisation. In Rwanda, despite some success in helping 
local “communes” plan, the decentralisation support has been re-focused, acknowledging 
the centralised nature of Rwandan government delivery. Land reform in Burundi is 
essentially a pilot cadastral service that has at core an attempt to resolve small land 
disputes and to make such a service self-financing. The media programme aims above all 




The Humanitarian Aid programme of SDC operates in the same countries as the regional 
cooperation but is neither working in the same geographical districts, nor the same areas 
of intervention. Essentially the programme is four large grants to WFP, ICRC and MSF 
Switzerland for work in Burundi and DR Congo. The largest tranche of this is for food aid 
following the world food price hike, followed by work with IDPs in north Kivu through ICRC 
and MSF. 
 
Political division IV work exclusively in Burundi on peace-building. Their work is in four 
areas; political dialogue, transitional justice, human rights and small arms control. Most 
importantly the political division helped to bring some of the parties to the conflict in 
Burundi into the peace process (including the current party of power) through quiet behind 
the scenes work. 
 
Performance of instruments 
 
As outlined above, all of the instruments save SECO are deployed in the Great Lakes 
region. Humanitarian aid, regional – i.e. development – cooperation and peace-building 
through the political division four.  
 
All three of these instruments appear to have performed well within their individual 
objectives. Probably the most straightforward example of this is health in Rwanda. In 2002 
SDC introduced – through its partner Swiss TPH – a pilot mutualised health insurance 
scheme. In 2005 the Rwanda government adopted this nationally and it has since 
achieved good coverage. The „mutuelle‟ scheme allows for a degree of self-financing in 
the health system, but also crucially offers the opportunity for targeting the poorest with 
free health care.  
 
The Rwanda health care support programme also offers some impressive results in the 
two districts where support is being directly provided. In Karongi the infant mortality rate 
decreased from 39 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2010 to 28 per 1,000 in 2011, and 
maternal mortality fell from 4 deaths/ 1,000 births to 0.8/ 1,000. In Rutsiro infant mortality 
fell from 13/ 1,000 to 10/ 1,000. Of course, there will be statistical anomalies, the 
decreases take place in the context of overall improving health indicators in Rwanda, and 
there are other major donors in these districts (for instance the global fund). Even so, SDC 
should be able to claim some attribution for these results. 
 
Table 2: Individual components of the SDC OSA regional programme. 
 
Programme Budget 2011 (m CHF) 
Health Burundi 2.85 
Health DRC 2.77 
Health Rwanda 1.05 
Psychosocial regional 2.11 
Land tenure Burundi 2.4*  
Decentralisation Burundi 1.04 
Decentralisation Rwanda 0.3 
Media regional 0.76 
Water and sanitation regional Planned** 
 
*Includes a contribution from the Netherlands 
**Planned at 7.82m CHF from 2011 – 2014. 
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In both Burundi and DR Congo the support to the health system is at a different level and 
a different stage. Whilst the Burundi programme invests with the Belgian technical 
cooperation (CTB) in the national Human Resources management in the Ministry of 
Health, the main part of the work is in the province of Ngozi. Here there has also been 
support to a pilot “mutuelle” system, support for the implementation of performance based 
financing (PBF) and free health care to under 5s and pregnant women (as per national 
policy). The mutuelle has not yet been replicated nationally, although the government is 
interested.  
 
In Ngozi itself the Swiss TPH support is more “hands on” than in Rwanda, where it was 
more in the nature of systems support. This reflects the basic level of organisation and 
staff capacity available in Burundi. In Ngozi province (pop. 700,000) there are only 27 
doctors. This represents one doctor for 25,000 people – 100 times the ratio for 
Switzerland (1 doctor per 250 people). In 2006 when the programme started, half the 
health centres did not have running water and a third did not have working fridges for 
vaccinations. As a result, the programme spans the spectrum from systems/ piloting 
technical support work to more basic provision of services. A good example of this is the 
recent support for vector control following a spike in malaria morbidity. SDC intervened 
directly through Swiss TPH to spray mosquito breeding zones, bringing down the infection 
rate. 
 
Even so, the results are again impressive. Since SDC supplied three ambulances the 
number of maternal deaths annually has decreased from 531 to 38! A 15-fold decrease – 
although of course the continued functioning of this and other aspects of the health 
system depends on external support, and will do for some time. 
 
The same is true in a different way in South Kivu, DR Congo. The health support initially 
has taken the form of rehabilitating clinics and hospital wards, provision of essential 
medicines for revolving funds and help with the introduction of performance based 
financing. However, it is increasingly also about trying to reform the system so that it is 
less about profit and more about public service. 
 
The issues in DR Congo are profound. Twenty years of kleptocratic government followed 
by twenty years of civil war has left the concept of public goods redundant. Rebuilding the 
basic elements of government, and then rebuilding the bond between citizen and 
government will not happen overnight. Part of this will be decentralising decision making 
to provinces such as South Kivu, given the vast size of the territory and the poor 
infrastructure. This is a work in progress, with “Ministers” being appointed a provincial 
level for areas such as health. SDC/ Swiss TPH is investing in this new structure, helping 
the new Minister reform his health administration. This is vital work, but slow and difficult 
to measure. 
 
In addition to the support to individual countries‟ health systems, SDC also supports a 
relatively new psychosocial programme, aimed at women who are victims of sexual abuse 
and domestic violence. This programme has grown out of the humanitarian aid support to 
centres that supported victims of rape, mostly in DRC. It is rooted in community based 
therapies, and seeks to provide durable solutions for women often ostracised from their 
communities as well as violated. The programme has a distinctive and innovative regional 
angle, putting together practitioners from the three countries to share experiences and 
methods. 
 
The decentralisation programme in Rwanda and Burundi has also delivered tangible 
benefits to the population, including schools, (small, feeder) roads, and government 
offices. In both countries there has also been a focus on support to the process of 
decentralisation, for instance the Ministry in Burundi and the development of district plans 
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in Rwanda. Nevertheless, the major part of this programme has been delivering 
development at the local level. In this respect it is decentralisation of development 
planning and inputs, not necessarily decentralisation of political power, although the latter 
was certainly part of the original vision. The lack of decentralisation of political power is 
part of the reason for a re-shaping of the Rwanda decentralisation programme.  
 
In Burundi there is certainly a high degree of local participation in local development 
planning. This has led to the 2010 annual report giving the programme the only “very 
satisfactory” scoring. What is exciting about the Burundi decentralisation programme is 
the interface between civil society and government at the local level - planning together, 
and then using this to leverage other donor funding, such as from the World Bank. SDC is 
playing an interesting catalytic role. 
 
Nevertheless, decentralisation from national to provincial level is more chaotic. 
Overlapping ministerial interests and mandates confuse the process. In that sense 
Burundi decentralisation is like a hybrid rural development programme. In the context of a 
country emerging from civil war it could also be viewed as part of an attempt to create a, 
“peace dividend”, bringing development and government to the “hills”. 
 
Land reform and media are the other substantial programmes in the peace and 
government portfolio. Land reform has at its core the issuing of land certificates, based on 
a participatory survey process overseen by the commune authorities. It has been a 
service in high demand since its inception, with over 2,500 certificates issued. It has also 
undoubtedly resolved small-scale disputes between neighbours, and is laying the 
foundation for formal land ownership, with the potential economic revolution that could 
entail. Currently, however, it is still very “pilot”; an interesting exploration in an interesting 
and important area. 
 
The media work is largely concentrated in DR Congo and Burundi for the time being, 
although there is an expansion planned into Rwanda pending a new law. The majority of 
this work to date has been about promoting regional understanding and about certain 
aspects of the conflict, for instance violence against women. 
 
The humanitarian aid portfolio is mainly concentrated in DR Congo, as this is the country 
that still has clear humanitarian need, although there was also food aid in Burundi during 
2010. As set out above, it is a relatively straightforward portfolio, funding WFP (DRC and 
Burundi), ICRC (DRC) and MSF Suisse (DRC). These organisations are “blue chip” in 
humanitarian terms – consistently delivering high quality humanitarian assistance, 
although WFP can often fall short on targeting and monitoring. In this sense the SDC HH 
portfolio is appropriate to the situation and whilst it has not been examined in the course 
of this evaluation, is likely to be well implemented. Interestingly, the HH programme takes 
place in a different region of DRC to the SDC OSA programme, and in different sectors. 
This will be explored further in the „complimentarity‟ section. 
 
Political Division IV (PDIV) is active in Burundi in peace-building. This work appears to 
have contributed to the CNDD-FDD and FNL joining the Arusha process. PDIV support to 
initiatives such as the new Independent Human Rights Commission also seems to have 
been fast and effective. This quiet mediation role is complemented by the Swiss chairing 
of the Peace Building Commission (PBC) at the United Nations. The PBC has played the 
dual role of both keeping Burundi on the agenda of the international community, and 
helping to remind the government of their commitments. As such it has been an important 
tool in the post-conflict peace-building period. 
 
Whilst the performance of the individual instruments within stated objectives is generally 
satisfactory, their impact on larger issues is less certain. A good example of this is the 
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donated ambulances in Burundi. They have dramatically reduced maternal mortality, but 
this reduction will be difficult to sustain without a government health system that can 
support them over the longer term. Whilst SDC and others are clearly working on this, 
progress is less visible – and much less straightforward to measure (but arguably the 
most important of the many health interventions). Of course a sustainable health system 
depends on functioning government more generally, and that depends on economics, 
security and legitimacy. 
 
In the area of peace and governance impact becomes even less certain. In Burundi, the 
PD IV intervention helped to bring the CNDD-FDD into the peace process, arguably 
accelerating the transition away from conflict. This is a very meaningful contribution. Both 
decentralisation programmes have tangible outputs, this is clear. Quite what the specific 
impact has been – especially on the particular areas of peace and governance – is 
unclear. This could also be said for land reform (still in its infancy, but with a lot of 
potential to really contribute to building sustainable peace), and for the media programme 
(good idea, well implemented but very difficult to practically measure). In fact 
measurement is very problematic. Burundi is currently slipping back into some form of low 
level, covert conflict. Does this mean the peace programme has failed? Burundi is the 
most corrupt country in east Africa, and nearly in the world. DR Congo is similar, with the 
arguably even weaker governance. Rwanda is a brittle autocracy still dealing with the 
legacy of its recent, horrific past. Does this mean the governance programmes have 
failed? 
 
Clearly this is not the case – a gross over simplification. Nevertheless, with so much to do, 
and such a complex web of external and internal institutions trying to do it, one can‟t help 
but feel that the more focused the Swiss programme is, the more likely it is to have real 
impact. 
 
The uncertainty of working in fragile contexts makes measurement challenging, and 
conceptions of transformative change complicated. It also can require – as already 
outlined in this section – a more „hands on‟ approach. 
 
The question of the number of staff needed to implement a fragile states programme, and 
the mixture of skills required is highly relevant in the Great Lakes. Currently the 
programmes in Rwanda and Burundi have a good mix of national and international staff, 
and of technical and managerial skills. In DR Congo, the programme is newer and as a 
result is still building its staffing numbers.  
 
What is clear from all three programmes however, is that fragile contexts need more staff 
when compared to regular development programming. There is a need for more staff input 
– both technical and managerial – for more programme oversight and for the best analysis 
of context possible. This latter point also means it is more important than in other contexts 
to have good national staff, and the right mixture of national staff as often in contested 
political environments it is important to have links to all. In Burundi national staff are key to 
both programme development and contextual analysis, and in all three countries partner 





1. All three instruments deployed in the Great Lakes – regional cooperation, 
humanitarian aid and peace building – have performed well within their individual 
objectives. 
2. Whilst there are some impressive results (particularly in the health programmes), 
these are easier to demonstrate at a micro level than a macro level.  
3. Work in fragile states is chaotic and needs a different type of approach to „regular‟ 
development. 
4. Improving the stability and sustainability of a country or context needs a „big picture‟ 
approach, combined with flexibility and commitment. 
5. Staff are particularly important in fragile contexts, with a more „hands on approach‟ 
needed than regular development contexts. National staff are particularly important. 
 
Analysis, flexibility and adaptability 
 
All three countries have impressive levels of analysis within the various Swiss institutions 
present, and excellent contacts. This is formally expressed in the MERV, but probably 
more important is the day-to-day access to senior officials in government (especially in 
Burundi), other donors and civil society. National programme officers are a key part of this 
network. It is they who often know influential people personally and who are privy to 
“breaking news” as it happens. Partners can also be a valuable source of information. For 
instance, in Burundi the most senior national staff know many senior politicians and 
bureaucrats. They are trusted and often very well informed. The current Foreign Minister 
of Burundi spent time in Switzerland during the peace negotiations, hosted by one of DP 
IV‟s partners. The Ambassador in Nairobi, who covers the Great Lakes, has access to the 
President‟s of Rwanda and Burundi. Cumulatively this adds up to the potential for 
sophisticated analysis. 
 
The degree to which this analysis feeds into programme choices and design is less 
obvious. This is also true of longer-term strategic analysis, of which there seems to be 
less formally. As with many organisations in the development sector, SDC appears to be 
extremely good at understanding what the problem is, but less clear about what the 
potential solutions are.  
 
It is clear that within the general programme envelopes there is a degree of flexibility. 
Responding to malaria epidemics, such as in Burundi, or to requests from government for 
essential equipment is absolutely possible. There are also small grants both within SDC 
and PDIV that can respond to unexpected humanitarian need, or emerging opportunities 
such as establishing the Human Rights Commission in Burundi. Larger mid-course 
corrections are also possible – the closing of the decentralisation programme in Rwanda 
is a good example.  
 
There is also a healthy degree of adaptability within the programmes. For instance, as per 
the previous section, the decentralisation programmes are as much about providing 
services at the local level as they are about delegation of authority. In Burundi they are 
about engaging civil society in development planning, and about leveraging larger funds. 
This can also be thought of in terms of the potential peace dividend and speaks to a 
generic “Swiss” decentralisation programme adapted to context. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a relatively low level of real delegated authority to the country and 
regional offices. The head of the regional office Great Lakes has a signing authority of 
200,000 CHF. This is compared to £5m for the Netherlands. What this means is that 
programme development typically has a longer timeframe, starting with feasibility studies, 
then credit proposal writing, and finally contracting of partners and other implementation 
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entities. This takes a minimum of a year but can take longer. This in turn means that 
Switzerland (and SDC) is likely, in the most part to end with programmes that are “safer”, 
and that take longer to plan and develop. Conversely, despite being a small donor, it is 
less likely to be nimble than some of the bigger donors. 
 
Whilst SDC does not display a level of flexibility consistent with that needed for working in 
fragile contexts, or with the INCAF principles, the long term commitment to countries is an 
excellent aspect of SDC work. This was highlighted by many of the partners of SDC, 
especially government, and is one of the essential building blocks of good work in such 
countries. It will take time to develop very chaotic and dysfunctional bureaucracies to the 
point where they can manage effectively, and SDC‟s commitment to this is admirable. 
This long term commitment cannot be a recipe for dogma however – long term 





1. All three countries in the Great Lakes region had impressive levels of analysis and 
good networks of contacts. 
2. Whilst the analysis is excellent, it is less clear how this informs programme choices or 
changes (with some notable exceptions such as the closure of the Rwanda 
decentralisation programme). There is less long term strategic planning. 
3. There is a generally high degree of programme adaptation. This may be connected to 
the rather formulaic/ generic nature of the programme portfolio. 
4. There is a degree of flexibility within programme envelopes, but not enough 






The Great Lakes region has a joint strategy between SDC regional cooperation (OSA), 
SDC humanitarian aid (HH) and the political direction IV of the foreign ministry. There is 
an annual meeting where all three departments come together, review progress and plan 
together for the coming year. This is obviously a much appreciated exercise and has led 
to a gradual increase in trust and cooperation between all three entities. A good example 
of this is the steadily increasing budget for small humanitarian aid actions controlled by 
the head of the regional office. The annual meeting also takes some hard decisions 
collectively, such as the decision to close decentralisation in Rwanda. 
 
Nevertheless, it is also true that the joint strategy is not so much joint as „proximate‟. 
Regional cooperation works in health and peace and governance. Humanitarian aid works 
in food security and IDPs. In DR Congo where the majority of humanitarian action is the 
partners are in North Kivu, where as the regional cooperation office is in South Kivu. 
There is no link between the two programmes. In Burundi the HH programme is a grant 
through WFP. This is not administered by the SDC office in Bujumbura and as a result 
there is no real link. 
 
In both Burundi and to a lesser extent Kivu, there has been a managed transition from a 
predominantly humanitarian portfolio to a predominantly development one. In Burundi the 
initial office was a humanitarian aid one, set up in 2005. By 2008 OSA had also started a 
programme in the country, and had a person hosted in the HH office. When the HH 
programme closed, OSA took over the office and some of the HH partners. OSA also took 
11 
over HH partners in Bukavu who were running transit houses and outreach programmes 
for women and girls who had been raped. 
 
PD IV is a little more strategically aligned, in that their work is in peace, which is also one 
of the areas for the regional cooperation office. However, the PD IV work is primarily 
centred on political dialogue – essentially keeping the various factions in peace talks 
(track 1/ 1.5), whereas the regional cooperation peace work centres on resolving land 
conflict and promoting regional cooperation through media. Whilst these are 
complimentary in the wider sense, they are not explicitly linked. Neither is there an explicit 
link between the promotion of human rights through civil society, for instance, and the 
work with similar civil society groups on land tenure. 
 
The reality is then, that whilst the three „instruments‟, OSA, HH and PDIV (and of course 
PDII) work extremely cooperatively, and that this tendency is improving to the point where 
there is some sharing of resources, there is not a great deal of real, strategic alignment. 
This observation can be extended to other areas of Swiss action – for instance the 
Ministry of Defence that has (or has had) military advisors deployed in both peacekeeping 
missions – Monusco in DR Congo and BNUB in Burundi. In both situations there has been 
some good “personal” cooperation, but there is little attempt at formal cooperation, never 
mind strategic alignment. Compare this with the efforts of the Netherlands in security 





1. The Great Lakes regional strategy is a highly appreciated exercise that has led to a 
gradual increase in trust and cooperation between the various instruments. 
2. The strategy is not truly common yet. The strategic choice of technical and 
geographical areas is different between regional cooperation and humanitarian aid, 
and whilst PD4 works in the same peace and governance area as SDC, its focus is 
different. 
3. There are other aspects of Swiss cooperation overseas that are not included in the 
„joint‟ approach, for instance security and commerce. 
4. Systems work against cooperation and collaboration, as it takes more time and effort 
to do things jointly. Collaboration happens despite, not because of, the systems. 
 
Role in the system 
 
Switzerland is generally well regarded as a donor. Governments and other donors 
interviewed for this study saw the Swiss as a reliable partner, working well in niche areas. 
Governments found the programmes aligned, although not as integrated as they might 
wish (i.e. in Rwanda they would much prefer budget support, but in the absence of this 
saw the Swiss action as supportive of their policy direction).  
 
In several cases Switzerland‟s “niche” role has allowed it to leverage funds from other 
donors. This happens in broadly two ways – either because Switzerland is working on the 
ground in a way that other donors can‟t (direct implementation, as in Burundi land reform), 
or because Switzerland is working in a sector that others would like to support but don‟t 
have the expertise – for instance decentralisation.  
 
Switzerland also occupies this “niche” role in aid coordination. Because there are often big 
aid blocks, like the European Union, or the US and smaller likeminded partners, 
Switzerland can play the role of neutral and outside of these blocks. This can work both to 
its advantage, and against it. In the best case scenario Switzerland can play the role of 
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honest broker, or “voice of reason” either supporting a particular block or helping that 
block moderate its message. In the worst case, Switzerland becomes marginal. 
 
In the Great Lakes region, whilst Switzerland is well networked into the various donor 
coordination mechanisms, and plays a generally positive – if somewhat neutral – role, this 
is less the case with regard to the multilaterals. In places this is due to the weakness of 
the multilaterals (for instance in Rwanda, where for historical reasons the UN is very low 
profile), or to their overly technical perspective (for instance the World Bank). However, in 
general there is less effort put into steering multilateral programmes than into the bilateral 
ones. There are some good reasons for this – time being a major element. In South Kivu 
for instance there is a complex coordination infrastructure, mostly humanitarian in nature, 
run by the UN. But the cooperation office does not have the time to engage with this 
structure. This is a loss, as so much of the decision-making takes place in these forums 
and as one of the few bi-laterals with a presence Switzerland could certainly punch above 
its weight. Having an HH person in the cooperation office might bridge this gap, and help 





1. Switzerland is a well-regarded donor, seen as reliable and occupying „niche‟ areas. 
2. In the best case this can leverage extra resources and lead to Switzerland convening 
donor coordination, playing a useful facilitator role. 
3. In the Great Lakes region there is less interaction with the multilateral system than is 




This evaluation into the work of SDC in fragile contexts is “developmental” in nature, 
meaning that it is intended to be as useful as possible to practitioners. As a result the 
conclusions are a mixture of the generic, of use to the organisation and the evaluation 




It is clear from the cursory analysis at the beginning of this case study that the problems of 
Rwanda, Burundi and DR Congo are intimately connected (to some extent these also 
extend to Uganda and Tanzania, and even South Sudan and Central African Republic). A 
prosperous region, with open borders, non-exclusionary politics and opportunity would 
also be stable. 
 
While Rwanda, Burundi and Congo remain poor, and its youth under-employed and ill-
educated there will remain the potential for violence. Exclusionary politics add to this, and 
a history of political violence means opposition is quick to pursue this option. Violence, 
conflict and failure in one state impacts on its fragile neighbour, potentially plunging them 
into conflict just as the neighbour emerges. This has created a “reservoir” of violence and 
conflict in the Great Lakes region that is continually destabilising.  
 
Breaking this cycle of violence – nurturing stability and ultimately development in all three 
countries – is a worthwhile goal. 
 
The Tajikistan case study set out a series of scenarios for that country. What is clear in 
the Great Lakes region is that “static” scenarios can only be part of the analysis, as events 
can change the entire sub-regional politic very quickly. If the elections in DRC were to be 
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fiercely contested by the opposition, reigniting the civil war, this would have dramatic 
consequences for both neighbours. The assassination of the Presidents of either Rwanda 
or Burundi could have equally destabilising consequences. 
 
The most optimistic scenario then is the “bumpy road”. Gradually there is stability, and 
development, albeit with a series of set backs along the way. Stagnation is another quite 
likely scenario, with politics in Rwanda and Burundi increasingly tightly controlled, and 
DRC stuck in dysfunctional corruption (with the accompanying donor withdrawal). 
 
If one takes the optimistic scenario as the working premise, then the question for SDC is 




The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is emerging from conflict, and if the current 
election cycle passes relatively smoothly, represents a moment of opportunity almost 
unique in the last 30 years. Whilst there is still conflict, corruption and dysfunction, there is 
also a government that recognises its own interest in developing the country, and has an 
international community willing to finance this. 
 
This is not to under-estimate the challenge that DRC faces. Even if there were political will 
at the top, the state apparatus is almost entirely broken. It is not just the roads that need 
to be fixed, but the bureaucracy and even the society itself. 
 
SDC has made a bold decision to start a cooperation programme early in the cycle of 
conflict, peace-building and stabilisation. This places SDC ahead of many other donors, 
and is a useful position for it to occupy. Whilst the programme is still in its infancy 
however, there is a danger that without a clearer focus it will get lost in the vastness of 
DRC, geographically, politically and economically. 
 
Currently the DRC cooperation office supports the health system (primarily) as well as 
psychosocial, media and soon also clean water programmes. Whilst these are worthwhile 
areas in their own right, other donors are intervening in these areas and often with greater 
resources. IRC – an American NGO – has a larger health programme with a very similar 
approach in South Kivu (the IRC budget in South Kivu alone is $20m US dollars). Unless 
SDC offers something additional, it is little more than a medium sized NGO in a crowded 
space.  
 
The obvious extra that SDC does have to offer is that it is a government entity, rather than 
simply another aid implementer. SDC can work on a political level as well as 
implementing. It can influence national and donor policy through its participation in state to 
state and multilateral forums, and it can use other aspects of Swiss action to inform policy 
development internationally, nationally and locally. For this to work however, it needs 
proper representation in the capital, and better resources in South Kivu for the task it has 
set itself. It also needs to better understand where it can add value within the plethora of 
other international actors. What will Switzerland‟s unique contribution to the stabilisation 




Burundi is the place where Switzerland has the highest profile and the most opportunity 
for influence. It is one of the top ten donors to the country; it chairs the peace building 
commission and has a history of innovative and interesting work in the last few years. It is 
also the most “joined up” programme from a Swiss perspective combining political, 
developmental and humanitarian instruments. 
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Nevertheless, the country itself is still incredibly fragile. Low level conflict, rampant 
corruption, a state almost entirely dependent on foreign assistance and no economy to 
speak of. On the plus side, it has a relatively free press and civil society and it has largely 
put its ethnic conflict behind it. 
 
Many of the respondents during the course of the case study highlighted a lack of 
government vision. One respondent likened the current government to wise elders in the 
village – they expect people to come to them for solutions to problems, rather than setting 
out a vision proactively. Whether this analysis is accurate or not, it is certainly true that 
there is not a compelling, organising narrative within government as in neighbouring 
Rwanda. Neither is there a bureaucracy capable of implementing a programme – the 
comparison is stark with Rwandan Ministerial offices efficient clean and busy, whereas 
Burundian government offices are often lacking even basic equipment. 
 
SDC are already helping government to get more organised – this is obviously essential 
work, although probably frustrating and risky at time too. The new Office for Burundi 
Receipts (OBR) offers a vision of how things can change however. This essentially tax 
collecting authority has doubled its revenue in two years to $440m USD this year (a third 
of GDP), supported by the Dutch and the British. This suggests that as in neighbouring 
DRC, sometimes government‟s problem is not so much unwillingness to do things, but 
simply a lack of organising ability.  
 
Donors can be incredibly helpful during this period of state re-establishment. Paul Collier‟s 
research suggests that in the years following the cessation of conflict technical advice 
(TA) to government can be more effective than finance – later this changes once the state 
is able to properly absorb the money. 
 
In Burundi, Switzerland can use its good reputation and it profile to become more 
engaged in “fixing” government. Ultimately Burundi will only move away from fragility with 
a well functioning government. The work in the provinces shows how this can be done – 
combining planning, civil society and practical support for targeted institutions.  
 
In thinking about how to go forward, SDC also needs to think more systematically about 
the “mix” of “aid modalities” it uses. There is a very small amount of direct budget support 
(in health HR), a majority of partnership implementation (Swiss TPH, local NGOs), some 
direct implementation (land reform) and some TA. Is there a need to increase some of this 
(for instance TA)? SDC also needs to consider its “risk” profile. Health is really a very safe 
area to be in, as is decentralisation. Land tenure is slightly “riskier”, and as a result quite 
innovative. Can SDC tolerate higher risk ventures? With less rigid programme 




Rwanda offers probably the greatest conundrum for SDC, and for the aid community 
generally. On the one hand it has the profile of a model developing country. Very low 
levels of corruption, positive vision of economic development coherently implemented, low 
levels of crime and a disciplined army. On the other hand it is a one party state with little 
guarantee that the current political and economic settlement will endure.  
 
As a donor it is necessary to engage (as the Netherlands does) with Rwanda as an „MDG 
state‟. Rwanda is on course to meet a majority of the MDGs. It receives 75% of external 
assistance as budget support of one form or another. 
 
As a small donor this is not terribly attractive – being a small contributor to a very large 
pot. It certainly leaves the question open as to whether there is need for expensive 
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staffing and office infrastructure etc. Given the nature of Rwanda‟s current „fragility‟ 
however (and the history of the genocide where most in-country development agencies 
missed the signs, and in some ways were even complicit), there is certainly potential for 
things to change relatively quickly. And there is much potential for Rwanda to influence 
events in Burundi and Congo. 
 
Given that SDC will remain engaged in Rwanda, and given the picture outlined above, the 
most useful contribution it can make is the combination of technical skills and resources it 
has used to best effect in the health system. The mutuelle is a success, but the pricing 
structure has just changed, leaving many observers worried about potential impact on the 
poorest. Access to the health system is clearly a contentious issue, although like most 
such issues in Rwanda not openly debated. SDC could help the government to 
understand the impact of the changed pricing structure, and to best target the poorest. 
Drawing on Swiss expertise and combining this with resources works well in contexts 




What is clear from the Great Lake case study is that SDC (and Switzerland more 
generally) does a lot of really good, interesting and technically competent work. What is 
also clear is that Switzerland as a donor generally likes to “play it safe”. Programmes take 
time to design and are generally “low risk”; in areas that are widely acknowledged as 
public goods, and implemented either directly or through partners (easiest to control 
fiduciary risk).  
 
In terms of aid modalities, SDC has the largest part of its portfolio with trusted partners 
(such as Swiss TPH), with national NGOs and through direct implementation. There is a 
very small amount of contribution to larger funds, and there is very limited amount of 
technical assistance.  
 
The aid modality with the greatest impact (or potential impact) in terms of change 
appeared to be a combination of expertise and resources, aimed at policy change in a 
relatively niche area. Health financing in Rwanda, land reform and participatory local 
development planning in Burundi. This is of course slightly different to impact in terms of 
results, where sectors such as health offer the best opportunities for measurement.  
 
SDC tends also to like to be engaged in more, rather than less, sectors (once more, 
arguably spreading risk). The regional OSA programme in the Great Lakes has 9 separate 
themes of activity, and is planning at least two more (climate change, skills development). 
There is also relatively little decentralised authority to the people on the ground.  
 
Arguably SDC sees itself as a technical development agency. In a similar way to 
humanitarian aid this can be presented as apolitical. Technical development work is about 
finding the right model, or scientific solution. Increasingly however, academics and other 
donors are suggesting that work in fragile states (and development generally), is 
inherently political. As the head of the Belgian Cooperation said in an interview during this 
case study, “You can‟t do structural development without political engagement”. 
 
The World Bank World Development Report 2011 on fragile states identifies security, 
justice and jobs as the biggest requirements. SDC is not active in any of these areas in 
the Great Lakes, although it is planning to work in the skills development sector in the next 
strategic plan.  
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The recent comprehensive review of development for the Dutch government3 suggests 
that often it is not working with civil society or with government that brings about 
meaningful change, but at the interface between the two. SDC is already doing some of 
this work, and could easily do much more. 
 
Theory of change?  
 
The implicit theory of change for Switzerland in the Great Lakes region is that a 
combination of service delivery and peace building will help to establish stability in the 
region, and ultimately deliver development. A mixture of tools, programmes and 
approaches are combined to deliver this vision. 
 
The idea of an explicit theory of change is challenging in some respects. It is clearly not 
for Switzerland alone to resolve the deep-rooted conflict and economic chaos of the Great 
Lakes region. Nevertheless, Switzerland feels it is its moral duty to help, and ultimately it 
is in the interest of all to have a stable prosperous Great Lakes region rather than a war 
torn, poverty stricken one. Neither does Switzerland have colonial hang-ups or murky 
business interests – it is quite a straightforward case of wanting to help. 
 
In such a situation – modest resources, no great political ambition beyond wanting the 
best – it is hard to have the arrogance that goes with setting out a bold vision for re-
engineering an entire region. Yet without such a vision, it is quite difficult to know what to 
prioritise – after all in places with nothing, everything is a priority. 
 
The question then, is whether certain actions are more necessary to begin with in certain 
contexts. Is it more important to pay the army than provide free rape counselling? Is it 
more important to provide judges with hotel costs than hospitals with essential drugs? 
This is made all the more difficult by the fact that certain of these actions are much more 
“palatable” to the general public and the parliament who are paying for them. Health care 
is self evidently a good thing to do. Babies get saved, mums get helped, and people with 
horrible injuries receive care. In more stable places – such as Rwanda – these efforts can 
be measured statistically providing further evidence that the right thing is being done. 
 
However in DR Congo, the SDC/ Swiss TPH supported hospital in Uvira makes $50,000 a 
month profit. Free drugs widely available for diseases the world wishes to eradicate in 
most other countries (for instance TB drugs, anti-retrovirals) are not available in this 
hospital because they don‟t make a profit for the staff. The “inspectorate” – the technical 
part of the Health ministry that is in charge of supervision of public health clinics and 
hospitals – essentially acts as a licensing agency, collecting rents from what are in 
essence private health care providers in the shell of the collapsed state. Providing hospital 
equipment and essential drugs into such a system is a painstaking business – the job of 
work that is needed is more about rebuilding a functioning public administration than the 
technical aspects of public health, or even putting in place the most sustainable public 
financing model. And a functioning public administration will only be viable in the context 
of a functioning state that desires such a public administration. And a state needs a basic 
legitimacy to function, and control of its territory at least to some degree. 
 
                                                        
3
 Lieshout, R et al (2010). Less pretension, more ambition. Amsterdam University Press. 
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The conclusion of this inadequate analysis of “what the goal is” has to be that: 
 
1. It is extremely complex. 
2. You can‟t possibly hope to do it alone. 
3. Sometimes the most attractive thing to do is not the most necessary. 
4. There is a high risk of failure. 
5. You have to have a really clear idea of not just what you think the problem is, but 
also what you think the solution is and what your part in that is. 
 
Many of the donor agencies most advanced in fragile states programming (the Dutch, UK 
and US for example all have fragile states strategies and policy units), subscribe to a 
basic “stabilisation – state building – sustainable development” framework. Whilst this is a 
gross over-simplification and it is certainly not a linear process, a comparison with the 
instruments currently available to Switzerland is illustrative. During the conflict phase 
Switzerland is able to deploy humanitarian aid simply to help those in greatest need. At 
the same time the political division IV works through diplomacy to resolve the conflict, 
bringing warring parties into political dialogue. Switzerland contributes multilateral 
resources and personnel to peacekeeping missions during an immediate post-conflict, 
“stabilisation” phase. And in terms of sustainable development there is a greater deal of 
technical depth and expertise within regional cooperation. Crudely then, this leaves a gap 




1. The forthcoming Great Lakes strategy should include a clear vision for SDC work over 
the long term as well as the medium term. The strategy should: 
 Set out where it sees the region in development terms in ten years time. 
 Set out where it sees the region politically in ten years time, including regional and 
security dimensions. 
 Set out how the individual work of SDC and other Swiss entities will contribute to 
the achievement of this vision. 
 Develop some simple methods for monitoring progress towards this vision, 
allowing for „course corrections‟.  
 Set out how SDC intends to work with others to achieve the strategy, both inside 
the Swiss government and with governments, donors and multilaterals in the 
region.  
 
2. SDC should encourage innovation within its Great Lakes programme portfolio, 
including some interesting and riskier elements of work. In particular, SDC should: 
 Work more at the interface of government and civil society.  
 Increase its technical assistance to governments in the region.   
 Work on job creation in the region, starting with its new Rwanda skills training 
focus. 
 
3. SDC should encourage greater flexibility within its Great Lakes programme. In 
particular it should: 
 Design programmes so that it is easier to change direction within a broad 
framework.  
 Decentralise authority from Bern to Kigali, and from Kigali to programmes, in 
particular budgetary authority (should be increased), but also decision making 
generally. 
 Ensure there is adequate staffing, if necessary by expanding the cadre of national 
staff and empowering them commensurately. 
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4. SDC should capitalise on the momentum created toward better joint working. In 
particular, SDC should consider: 
 The humanitarian and development portfolios working in the same geographical 
location, with complimentary activities. This should start in DR Congo by unifying 
presence in South Kivu.  
 Find ways of collaborating with other aspects of Swiss involvement in the region 
i.e. defence and commerce,  
 Seek opportunities to harmonise efforts at an international level with efforts at a 
national level i.e. such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (for 
instance by SDC supporting its implementation on the ground, or feeding 
advocacy internationally).  
 Pilot joint funding of projects, perhaps through simplified mechanism or pooling.  
 Better coordinate work in South Kivu with the Kinshasa embassy. 
 
5. SDC should continue to seek out opportunities to lead on donor coordination groups. 
SDC should also proactively engage more with multilaterals in the region, in particular 




Annex 8 : Desk review case study on the performance of SDC 
instruments in fragile and conflict-affected contexts 
  
This annex sets out the substantive points from the three desk reviews (Nepal, the 
Occupied Palesinian Territories and the Hindu Kush programme) that were undertaken as 
part of the evaluation. The desk reviews were purposely „ light touch‟, drawing on project 
documents and a few targeted telephone interviews (somewhere between four and six). 
The short bullet point summaries were then shared with the respondents at first, and more 
widely with other stakeholders and interlocators later. 
 
The desk reviews are structured against the lines of enquiry set out for the evaluation, and 
telephone interviews were conducted along these lines. Despite the relatively light nature 
of the exercise, it proved difficult to undertake all of the desk reviews on time due to 
people‟s availability and to heavy workload meaning that respondents were often obliged 
to cancel at short notice. 
 
The desk reviews were conducted on an entirely confidential basis, allowing respondents 
to be more candid than they may have been able to in another format. This proved 
invaluable to the main evaluation, but meant that it was not possible to write the desk 
reviews in full. The compromise was to extract generic conclusions of relevance under 
each area of enquiry, presenting these as an annex to the main report.  
 
In addition to these three desk reviews, the evaluation also looked at Haiti, the human 
rights and conflict thematic network and the fragile states work carreid out by the global 
cooperation team. Whilst these substantively and greatly informed the main evaluation 




The Nepal programme breaks down as follows 
 
 CHF 25 million in long term projects (10-15 years) supported in 3 year phases.  
 CHF 1 million from DP4 in small flexible projects and grants  
 10 Swiss staff and 10 Nepalese staff 
 
The SDC portfolio is widely seen as very strong with a good history as a „flag ship 
programme‟. Nepal has the maximum budget allowed for any country in the Swiss system. 
 
Approaches, Instruments, Delivery Mechanisms and Modalities 
 
 The Nepal programme was where the conflict sensitive programme management 
(CSPM) approach was developed. This is the main instrument used to support 
programme officers in the field to manage development programmes in a conflict 
sensitive way.  
 Human resources are key to effective performance in terms of capacity to deliver, and 




Analysis and Flexibility and Adaptability 
 
 Context analysis is undertaken through an adapted version of the MERV system, 
which is seen as a useful tool. The key contextual factors affecting the programme are 
environmental, economic, political, security related. The MERV is done quarterly, and 
synthesised annually for the annual report cycle. This is then linked to the quarterly 
programme review.  
 On district level a mini-MERV is done every two month with all SDC partners together 
and based on the analysis, adaptation of the projects are undertaken defined. In 
addition twice a year a social and political actor mapping is done by all the partners 
working together. 
 Analysis needs to take into account a whole range of contextual factors. One of the 
most important is the issue of discrimination. Gender, ethnic and caste sensitivity 
needs to be built into programmes at all levels.  
 The major deterrent to flexibility is seen as the administrative consequences of making 
changes to programmes. This can lead to strategic inertia and be a disincentive to 
change. 
 A key tool for operational flexibility are scenarios, which are built into country 
strategies, thereby enabling a kind of structured flexibility  
 Programme reviews also create the space for reorientation and adaptation. 
 The key is flexible funding – the 200k discretionary spend by Country Directors plus 
500k by head of division is seen as sufficient in this regard. The key is getting people 
to use this as a means of flexibility.  
 
Complementarity of SDC Mandates 
 
 Nepal is one of the few countries where all the departments for foreign offices and 
embassies work in a fully integrated fashion. The embassy, SDC, PD4 and PD2 all 
work under supervision of Ambassador who is also the SDC country director.  
 The CD / Ambassador is the interlocutor for all the agencies of Berne – taking the 
whole of government approach further than anywhere else. The key is the different 
arms working out common outcomes and sharing the division of labour on the basis of 
„capacities, not turf battles‟.  
 The problems in integration are seen as stemming from higher level institutional 
battles. If people are interested in „turf‟ higher up the system, this causes problems 
down the line.   
 Back office integration is a key lesson learnt from the UN „Delivering as One‟ which 
has been applied in Nepal 
 There is a real need to think through not just development-humanitarian links but also 
the connections with global cooperation. Sometimes the latter approve programmes 






SDC’s Role in the Broader System 
 
 Switzerland is seen as playing an active role in the international donor system in 
Nepal, chairing the Nepal Peace Trust Fund, developing the donor basic operational 
guidelines, and chairing a resident representative consortium on the space for 
development.  
 Switzerland is also co-chairing the BOGs (Basic operational guidelines) group with the 
UN.  The BOGs are seen as a powerful instrument to widen the space for 
development, and is signed by all the bilateral donors, UN agencies and INGOs. 
 Other donors recognise that Switzerland brings value as a responsible, active and 
impartial facilitator 
 Despite being a small player Switzerland does have considerable influence. This is a 
function of the long history and trust among the government, but also the innovations 
that have been applied in the way Switzerland works.  
 The niche is for Switzerland, not SDC. The niche needs to be occupied with a 
combination of PD2, PD4 and SDC.  
 SDC works closely with CSOs and local government – this is seen as very important 
as in fragile states, state is weak or party to conflict, or has no political will.  
 
Occupied Palestinian Territories  
 
 SDC  opened an office and started its development programme in the OPT in  1994, 
when the Federal Council decided to invest in the building of a future Palestinian State 
after the signing of the Oslo I accords. Switzerland had been supporting Palestine 
refugees through its contributions to UNRWA and the ICRC since 1950. 
 
Approaches, Instruments, Delivery Mechanisms and Modalities 
 
 Both development and humanitarian instruments are employed in an integrated 
fashion, using the comprehensive aid approach. SDC focuses its intervention on two 
areas: rule of law and protection & economy and employment. On the humanitarian 
side, there is a focus on humanitarian advocacy which is rare among the bilateral 
donors.  
 Projects are seen  to have positive repercussions and positive spill-overs  
 The technocratic and bureaucratic approach works best when it is complement with a 
strategy and priorities that are based on a full understanding of political situation and 
the network of key actors.  
 Everything is political in the OPT context. The major issues – legal, political, security, 
development are all closely intertwined, meaning that effective performance in, for 
example, humanitarian work means engaging with political issues.  
 There is a need for an effective and efficient policy dialogue, which is best met by 
close integration of the development and diplomatic arms of Switzerland.  
 An M&E system has been designed and will be started in January 2012. The results-
based management approaches need to be adapted to take account of qualitative 
results and longer term results.  
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 Knowledge management and the networks are seen as vital for strengthening 
performance. The networks need to carry on developing, and reach beyond SDC to be 
Swiss networks. 
 
Analysis and Flexibility and Adaptability 
 
 Analysis is done as part of Annual reports, which uses RBM approach, MERV 
annually, and mid term reviews 
 Local and national staff are key to context analysis. The wider networks of 
international actors is also key. Coordination meetings are very useful. Engagement 
with the PD2 political officer is useful. 
 The programme is designed for robustness in the face of a dynamic and changing 
context. Being too flexible means losing focus. Much of the space is present, but there 
is a need for more flexibility from head office. 
 
Complementarity  of SDC Mandates 
 
 Development and humanitarian sit together well, along with human rights. This gives 
SDC considerable latitude in terms of programming and advocacy. The OPT 
programme is part of the Europe and Mediterranean Division (EMM) which, for 
institutional reasons and as a result of SDC reorganisation in 2008, ispart of the 
humanitarian aid domain, even though it manages both development and 
humanitarian programmes in the Middle East and North Africa. Development was 
integrated into humanitarian, but the opposite may have worked better for institutional 
purposes. 
 Development and humanitarian work is seen as part of Swiss foreign policy – they 
coordinate with other elements and work to influence them: “whole of government is 
key”. 
 At the moment the different elements of Swiss effort work in parallel but not in concert. 
A few common goals across the different elements would help a great deal, but these 
will not happen easily. 
 There is a need to find ways to better integrate political and diplomatic with 
development. Overcoming the past divisions is a major challenge but it can be done 
with the right leadership. A true WoG approach would help them be far more 
recognised and have a greater impact – there will be positive multipliers. A key factor 
is the people involved – a cohesive leadership depends not just on capacities but also 
on personalities. But even more important are the structures and processes, 
 One major problem is that the offices are separate – development and humanitarian in 
Jerusalem and political in Ramallah. The benefits of colocation can be considerable.  
 It works well in the field despite the system – structural and process – not because of 
the system. To reap the benefits, the senior management have to let go of the idea 
that one Swiss arm should be subordinate to another – the focus should be mutual 






SDC’s Role in the Broader System 
 
 The niche is not an SDC niche but is a Swiss niche. The different elements meet 
together coordinate, discuss and make decisions. The key is having the freedom not 
to always „toe the line‟ but to have the freedom to voice different opinions.  
 Most partners have been working with SDC for more than 7 years, and there is a 
sense of history in the relationship. At their best, these partnership reach beyond 
individual relationships to being genuine institutional partnerships 
 There are good examples of linking to other donors – for example, pooling funds with 
Scandinavians and Netherlands – which reduces transaction costs, enables a more 
strategic intervention, and better policy dialogue between donors and human rights 
community 
 SDC also supports NGOs and local partners with capacity, core grants. Its network of 
partners (for e.g. in Gaza) could be of use across the board. 
 Also support the multilateral system – chair the subcommittee of UNRWA and support 
UNOCHA advocacy work, support to UNDP capacity work. ICRC contribution 




SDC works in the Fatah area of the Hindu Kush, and works in three main domains 
 
 Rural development – livelihoods and water 
 Governance – work with communities and duty bearers to deliver better services to 
communities.  
 Humanitarian programme, focusing on vulnerable groups – IDPs, women, children. 
Humanitarian also does work on access to safe water, reconstruction of public schools 
and disaster risk reduction.  
 
Approaches, Instruments, Delivery Mechanisms and Modalities 
 
 Issues of fragility were widely seen to have a bearing on performance issues, 
especially in relation to linkages to and negotiations with governments and security 
issues 
 There is a serious lack of clarity between SDC and the Embassy about who has 
overall responsibility for security management and incidents  
 The commitment to work in fragile states has to made throughout the organisation and 
needs to be closely related to career planning. 
 It is difficult to spend quickly in fragile contexts, and this is a challenge for all donor 
agencies who are incentivised by disbursements  
 The mandate is seen as comprehensive but not always relevant to the needs on the 
ground – health and education systems, like many others, are poor in these areas, but 
the development side is not working on either, which limits the contribution they can 
make. There is work in both of these by the humanitarian side.  
 A results framework has been developed and will be implemented. This was done with 
support from the Nepal country office. The key is to ensure this doesn‟t become an 
academic exercise to please head office, but instead is grounded in strategic and 
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operational decision making. Sound results make a real difference – the example was 
given of the Secretary of the SAFRAN Ministry who still regularly and publicly talks 
about an SDC project (Kalam integrated development initiative) because of the results 
demonstrated.  
 The above said, results are a tool for addressing issues of legitimacy and trust and 
there was felt to be an open question about whether results based management is the 
optimal tool to address these issues in fragile contexts.  
 Capacity to deliver is the major issue affecting performance – both in SDC and among 
partner organisations. Humanitarian has its own implementing structure and does 
implementation work for UNICEF and DFID. 
 Certain conventional development instruments such as „heavy logframes‟ are seen to 
be at a disadvantage in fragile states – delivery against pre-set goals and objectives 
was seen by some as not always possible at the level of detail expected in stable 
contexts. Opinion varied about this issue, especially at head office.  
 Staff are not rewarded for working in fragile contexts – there is no career system akin 
to those in other donors, and no strategy to ensure experiences are shared and 
become grounded in the organisational memory 
 It is not easy to get suitably qualified local and national staff in the Fatah region - there 
is a discrepancy between the capacity available and the needs of the project.  
 
Analysis, Flexibility and Adaptability 
 
 Good analysis should be a means by which to establish a common understanding 
about the challenges and opportunities facing a programme.  
 Political factors are one of the key gaps in SDC‟s analysis – not enough allowance is 
made for such factors. Another key issue is security – each and every programme and 
staff member needs to have their security risks carefully and continually assessed.  
 The pressure of delivering annual results means that certain ways of working are not 
possible – the focus is on quick results is often at the expense of meaningful results 
 There is a lot of flexibility in terms of who SDC can work with, and once a programme 
is approved, there is flexibility for tactical adaptations to local contexts.  
 The approvals procedure for mid-term changes at head office is seen to be overly 
bureaucratic and as taking a long time. SDC is not sufficiently decentralised 
financially. Above CHF 200k, there might need to be 5-6 people signing off on 
changes, which was seen as much too „heavy‟. There were also concerns raised that 
many different kinds of people needed to sign off, and they had varying knowledge of 
the context and the situation.  
 The human rights and conflict network is seen as useful as a means of sharing 
experiences and ideas. There is a need to involve national and operational staff more 





Complementarity of SDC Mandates 
 
 Different mandates have different pluses and minuses in fragile contexts. Regional 
cooperation has scope to do lots of different kinds of work, but can sometimes be 
dominated by head office requirements. The flexibility if humanitarian aid makes it 
suited to working in fragile contexts, but the content of such programmes can be too 
shallow and not sufficiently focused on drivers of fragility and conflict. On the other 
hand, working in a participatory fashion was seen as a useful and important way to 
learn from communities, and this does play a role in the humanitarian effort.  
 There is some joint planning because of the co-location and shared geographical 
focus. Cooperation between development and humanitarian is often a function of 
personalities and not the system. There are common weekly meetings, sharing of 
challenges, joint field missions. There is a need for this to be more strategic than it is – 
and move towards joint interventions with shared goals and collaborative delivery 
 Global cooperation is seen as separated from the other mandates, and needs to be 
better integrated. At the moment there is an issue about where Global is „allowed to 
work‟ for fear of duplication, but this does not allow for synergies to be explored and 
maximised.  
 
SDC’s Role in the Broader System 
 
 The whole of government approach is seen as an advantage – it is key to have critical 
mass from all the four arms of Switzerland.  
 Working with partners requires good understanding of risks faced, and 
acknowledgement of when the Swiss government is transferring risk and when it is 
sharing risks. Taking responsibility for risks is crucial.  
 Engagement with other donors is very important, and done both formally and 
informally. SDC has advocated for a shared donor forum for the frontier region, for the 
purpose of harmonisation. However, this needs to take account of potential risks, 
especially given the Swiss reputation for impartiality. Where coordination isn‟t possible 
or desirable, working in a complementary fashion should be the goal. 
 SDC also supports the multilateral system, for example, the World Bank Water and 
Sanitation programme has SDC secondees.  
 The niche in fragile states is not SDC but Swiss. A lot can be learnt from other small 
European donors – especially Sweden and Denmark. Switzerland has an advantage 
of being more operational, working with implementing partners rather than supporting 
the government.  
 
 
